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The Bifurcation of Undersecured Residential
Mortgages Under S 1322(b)(2) of the




One of the most controversial and contested bankruptcy issues addressed
by our courts and pondered by the bankruptcy bar in recent years has been
whether an undersecured residential mortgage may be subject to bifurcation
under chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. The judiciary's struggle with this
debate has been both compelling and frustrating to observe as one speculates
how the matter will be ultimately resolved.
The significance of this issue is equally important for the individual debtor
seeking relief under chapter 13, who hopes to repay as much of his or her prepe-
tition indebtedness as possible and to save a home from impending foreclosure;
and for the creditor, who needs to minimize threatened losses to its claims
against the debtor in wake of the debtor's waning financial condition. This fact
has not been lost in the many courts that have had to determine if, and to what
extent, bifurcation of undersecured residential mortgages is permitted under
chapter 13's § 1322(b)(2). 2 The courts have employed various principles of statu
tory construction to find out exactly what Congress intended when it enacted
language under § 1322(b)(2) protecting from modification "the rights of holders
of secured claims... secured only by a security interest in real property that is
the debtor's principal residence. . . . .. The courts have searched for the mean-
ing of§ 1322(b)(2) in scantly written legislative history, and they have reached
back into the annals of our bankruptcy laws to find additional support for their
interpretations of § 1322(b)(2). One can also find resuscitations of the basic
principles of bankruptcy law, concerning the delicate balance between providing
'Associate Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law. The author
would like to give special thanks and acknowledgment to Ms. Monique Abacherli, her research assistant.
Ill U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-30 (Vest 1979 & Supp. 1993).
211 U.S.C.A. § 1322(b)(2) (West Supp. 1993).
3Id.
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"equity" for the creditor and a "fresh start" for the debtor, interjected throughout
this rich body of judicial opinions.
How this question is to be resolved is uncertain. During the last congres-
sional term, both the House and Senate proposed bankruptcy reform legisla-
tion that included amendments to § 1322(b)(2) that would have prohibited the
bifurcation of such claims under a chapter 13 plan. 4 Although the proposed
legislation was generally supported by both houses of Congress, it did not pass
due to last minute amendments made to the bill by the Senate before the House
was to vote on the bill and adjourn for the term. Nevertheless, there is great
expectation that this or similar bankruptcy reform legislation will be introduced
in the 103d Congress in 1993. The passage of this legislation or similar legisla-
tion would bring this debate to an end soundly in favor of the home mortgage
lending industry.
In August of 1992 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in its decision in
Nobleman v. American Savings Bank (In re Nobleman),5 interpreted § 1322(b)(2)
of the Code as prohibiting the bifurcation of a claim secured only by a lien against
a debtor's principal residence. This decision is contrary to the position taken
previously by the Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Ninth and Tenth
Circuits on the same question. 6 On December 7, 1992 the Supreme Court
granted a petition for certiorari, filed by the debtor in Nobleman, to resolve
the split now existing among the courts of appeals. Accordingly, the resolu-
tion of this question by Congress or by the Supreme Court is imminent and
creates a dramatic pause for the bankruptcy bar.
This article looks critically at the debate as it has been waged in the courts,
and how it might be resolved by the Supreme Court or through legislative
amendment. The question to be considered is which side of the debate is more
correct in its interpretation of § 1322(b)(2). The answer is found in the lan-
guage of the provision, the legislative history, congressional intent, and the fun-
damental principles of bankruptcy law. Past proposals for legislative amendment
are also considered in terms of how they support or slight the basic equitable
principles embodied in our bankruptcy law, and whether this proposed reso-
lution represents a fair and reasonable extension of bankruptcy protection, or
an inequitable preference for the home mortgage industry.
The first two sections of this article describe the significance of chapter
13 relief under the Bankruptcy Code as an option for individual debtors, and
discuss Code provisions that are relevant to the determination of whether bifur-
48. 1985, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 310 (1992); H.R. 6020, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 202 (1992). See infra
notes 236-46 and accompanying text.
1968 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 654 (1992).
6Lomas Mortgage USA v. Wiese, 980 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir. 1992); Bellamy v. Federal Home Loan Mort-
gage Corp. (In re Bellamy), 962 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1992); Eastland Mortgage Co. v. Hart (In re Hart), 923
F.2d 1410 (10th Cir. 1991); Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1990); Hougland
v. Lomas & Nettleton Co. (In re Hougland), 886 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1989).
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cation is permissible or not permissible under chapter 13. Following these sec-
tions is an analysis of the body of case law that has developed over the years
addressing this question. The next section reviews the legislative proposals
to amend § 1322(b)(2), and the testimony presented to Congress on behalf of
creditor and debtor representatives specifically addressing this question and
the appropriateness of the proposed amendments. The final section considers
how the Supreme Court might resolve the debate in light of recent bankruptcy
decisions by the Court; it also provides commentary on the legislation proposed
by Congress during the last congressional term, how it fits into the statutory
scheme of the Code, and how it could affect the basic bankruptcy principles
embodied in chapter 13.
II. CHAPTER 13: A DESIRABLE OPTION FOR BANKRUPTCY RELIEF
Our bankruptcy laws have reflected sensitivity toward the personal struggle
that the financially distressed individual wages in making the decision to seek
such relief. This sensitivity is found in the availability of two types of relief
that an individual debtor may choose from under the Bankruptcy Code.7
The first type of relief available to the debtor is commonly known as "straight
bankruptcy" and is found in chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.8 By seeking
relief under chapter 7, the debtor elects to have his or her nonexempt assets
liquidated by the trustee to go toward the payment of all prepetition debts.9
This option for relief also entitles the debtor to a discharge of personal liabil-
ity for any balances remaining against these debts after the proceeds from the
liquidation have been distributed to the prepetition creditors.0 However, relief
under chapter 7 may prove to be an undesirable option for the individual
who either feels a moral responsibility to make a best effort to repay the entire
7Individuals seeking relief under the Bankruptcy Code may file under chapter 7, chapter 11 or chapter
13 of the Code, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-28, §§ 1101-46 and §§ 1301-30 (West 1979 & Supp. 1993). Under
chapter 7 the debtor's non-exempt assets are liquidated by the trustee. The trustee creates a fund to dis-
tribute to the debtor's creditors who hold prepetition debts against the debtor. The debtor is discharged
of his or her prepetition debts, with certain exceptions, and is permitted to retain exempt assets to begin
a fresh start. In a chapter 13 case the debtor's assets are not liquidated to pay the claims of prepetition
creditors. Instead, the debtor is required to propose a plan to repay these debts within a three to five-year
period. Under this plan the creditors are required to receive no less than what they would receive under
a chapter 7 liquidation. After the debtor's completion of the payments under the plan, the debtor is given
a discharge from the prepetition debts. The debtor's eligibility for relief under chapter 13 is determined
by the total amount of the debtor's secured and unsecured debts: the debtor's unsecured debts must be
less than $100,000 and secured debts must be less than $350,000. 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(e) (West 1993)).
This relief is also available to the nonbusiness and the small business debtor, if the debts do not exceed
the statutory limits. If the debts exceed these limits, the debtor is permitted to make a filing under chapter
11. See Toibb v. Radloff, 111 S. Ct. 2197 (1991).
811 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-28 (West 1979 & Supp. 1993).
9See Id. §§ 704(l), 725 and 726.
'Old. § 727.
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balance due on prepetition indebtedness." or who wants to avoid the loss of
valuable nonexempt assets through a liquidation' 2 In such a case, chapter 13
of the Code is the better option.
Under chapter 13 of the Code, the debtor is able to propose a plan for the
readjustment or reorganization of his or her prepetition debts and the payment
of such debts, in full or partially, from future income, 3 and is also able to retain
any valued prepetition property' 4 Petitions for relief under chapter 13 may be
filed by "individuals with regular income" who at the time of the filing of the
petition have unsecured debts not exceeding $100,000 and secured debts not
exceeding $350,000.' The term "individual with regular income" includes an
individual whose income is "sufficiently stable and regular to enable such
individual to make payments under [a Chapter 13 plan]."'16
The original idea behind this concept of readjustment or reorganization of
a debtor's debts was to motivate overburdened debtors to make an effort to
repay their prepetition debts from future earnings rather than opt for straight
bankruptcy or liquidation: 7 Chapter 13 contains several incentives for the debtor
1'[T]he debtor's personal sense of morality cannot be ignored in choosing the appropriate insolvency
proceeding. The debtor who feels a moral obligation to pay debts may opt for Chapter 13 instead of Chap-
ter 7 for that reason.' BENJAMIN WEINTRAUB & ALAN N. RESNICK, BANKRuUPTCY LAW MANUAL, 9.02, at
9-5 - 9-6 (1986).
12For a description of the significance of exempt and nonexempt property at bankruptcy, see note 24 infra.
1311 U.S.C.A. § 1322 (West 1979 & Supp. 1993).
141d. § 1306(b) (West Supp. 1993).
l5ld. § 109(e) (West 1993).
16 1d. § 101(30) (West 1993). Individuals qualifying for relief under chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act,
the predecessor of chapter 13, had to be "wage earners.' This meant that only "individuals whose principal
income [was] derived from wages, salary or commissions" could seek relief thereunder. Bankruptcy Act of
1898, 11 U.S.C. § 606(8), reprinted in App. 1 COLLIER ON BAKRatUPTCY 245 (Lawrence P. King, ed., 15th
ed. 1992). The impact of this limitation made chapter XIII relief too exclusive. For example, sole proprietors
of small businesses were not able to seek relief under chapter XIII, and were limited to liquidation relief
or were required to seek reorganization under the more costly and time consuming chapter XI, generally
suitable for reorganizations of larger corporate entities. Moreover, individuals receiving regular income through
means other than wages and the like were also excluded from chapter XIII relief. This meant that persons
receiving regular and steady income from "investments, pensions, social security or welfare," could not apply
for relief under chapter XIII and were essentially limited to liquidation. H.R. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
at 118-119 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6078-80.
17The first wage earner provision to appear in our bankruptcy laws was in the 1933 amendments to
the Bankruptcy Act, which were recommended by Thomas D. Thacher, Solicitor General under the Hoover
Administration. As Solicitor General he conducted a study of the bankruptcy system that revealed many
shortcomings in relief available to consumers:
Our inquiry has led us to the following conclusions: (1) that most wage earners
who fall into debt desire to pay their debts in full and want to avoid the stigma of
bankruptcy; (2) that they are driven into bankruptcy chiefly by garnishments and
other attachments; (3) that at least a third of the wage earners who are now forced
into bankruptcy and released from their debts could, if given time and protection,
pay their creditors in full; (4) that if the law offered such relief without stigma, a still
larger number of wage earners, who now resort to loan companies in an effort to stave
off their creditors and gradually get into debt beyond their capacity to pay, would
find a means of relief at a comparatively early stage of indebtedness ....
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to choose chapter 13 as an option of relief that are not found in a chapter 7
liquidation. This option protects the moral sense of responsibility for the debtor
who is reluctant to seek relief under the Code in fear of the stigma that
bankruptcy holds for some individuals.0 8 By seeking relief under chapter 13,
the debtor is able to get much needed financial relief, and, at the same time,
demonstrate to creditors a clear desire to pay off his or her debts. 9
Chapter 13 relief also becomes a better option because the discharge may
prove to be greater for a particular debtor than that found under chapter 7.20
In a chapter 7 liquidation the debtor's discharge may be somewhat limited by
the classification of certain debts as "nondischargeable" under § 523 of the
The whole problem of wage-earner bankruptcies is of such major importance that
we think it should be dealt with, not by attempting to restrict their bankruptcies
or to place new hardships upon small debtors, but to create provisions that will do
justice to creditors on the one hand, and on the other, will afford to financially embar
rassed wage earners a form of constructive relief from the staggering burdens of loans
and interest charges which they are now carrying in an attempt to save themselves
from the stigma of the only proceeding now available to them.
ThomAs D. ThACHER, REPORT op THE ATR-NEy GaNERA. oN BANmTcy LAw AND PruAcIc, S. Doc. No.
65, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess. 80, 85 (1932).
'
81t is clear from the following statements concerning the first wage earners provisions recommended
for enactment in 1933, and the statements of Senator DeConcini to the Senate regarding the House Amend-
ments to the bill proposing the amendments to the Bankruptcy Act, that wage earners relief was to help
lessen the moral burdens of bankruptcy for the debtor and offer a possibility of greater repayment of debts
to creditors:
The purpose [of Chapter VI] is to encourage honest debtors, who wish to avoid
the stigma of bankruptcy, to seek remedial relief at an early stage of insolvency when
there is still something worth saving for their creditors, instead of waiting until all
is lost and then being forced into bankruptcy.
Memorandum by Solicitor General relative to S. 3866 and H.R. 9968, to amend the Bankruptcy Act, printed
for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary, contained in S. REP. No. 1215, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1933).
Debtors under this chapter will be able to voluntarily pay off their debts while being
under the protection of the court. This allows for greater payouts to creditors than
would probably occur if the debtor took straight bankruptcy, and it preserves the
debtors selfesteem by permitting him to pay his debts using his best efforts without
incurring undue hardship.
124 Cong. Rec. S 17404 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini), reprinted in App. 3 CoL-
aRr, supra note 16, at X-9 - X-10.
'9Weintraub & Resnick state:
Although the new Code eliminates the labels "bankrupt" and "adjudication" for all
debtors, nevertheless a good faith effort to pay past debts under court protection
is looked upon more favorably by the community than a total avoidance of liabilities
through a discharge. This factor may be important to individuals who are concerned
about personal image as well as the ability to obtain credit in the future. Extending
credit to someone who despite past financial misfortunes, has attempted to pay as
much as possible from future earnings is much more preferable to creditors than advanc
ing credit to someone who has not even bothered to make the attempt.
,VaEnriuAtu & REsNicK, supra note 11, 9.02 at 9-5.
2OId.
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Code.21 The types of debts that are classified as nondischargeable are debts
that may have been incurred by the debtor wrongfully, or are of the type that
it would be contrary to the public welfare to allow a debtor to be discharged
of continued responsibility for such indebtedness.22 If the debtor has a signifi-
cant number of these debts outstanding at the time of bankruptcy, a discharge
under chapter 7 may severely impede the debtor's hopes for a meaningful fresh
start upon discharge. In the alternative, the debtor might prefer to file for relief
under chapter 13 and propose to pay some or all of these obligations under the
plan. Upon the completion of the payments under the chapter 13 plan, the
debtor will be eligible to receive a discharge from most of the nondischargea-
ble debts falling within § 523(a), as well as all other prepetition debts. 23
The most compelling incentive under chapter 13 can be found in the ability
of the debtor to retain nonexempt assets. This feature of chapter 13 relief is
very important to the debtor with significant nonexempt assets. Because these
assets do not qualify as "exempt" property under § 522(b) of the Code,24 the
debtor would lose these assets to liquidation under chapter 7 and would be well-
advised to seek relief under chapter 13 in order to hold onto these valued assets.25
Exempt properties are generally limited by dollar value and to properties
that are essential to a debtor's daily needs. 26 One of the most significant types
2 1Section 727(b) of the Code grants the debtor a discharge of all prepetition debts except for the debts
described under § 523. 11 U.S.C.A. § 727(b) (West 1979). The debts listed under § 523(a) include out-
standing tax liabilities; indebtedness that the debtor may have incurred through fraudulent or tortious conduct;
alimony or child support obligations; fines, penalties or forfeitures payable to and for the benefit of govern,
mental units; outstanding educational loans that are backed by governmental units or nonprofit institutions;
debts resulting from the debtor's operation of motor vehicles while legally intoxicated or under the influence
of illegal drugs; or debts that were not discharged in a debtor's prior chapter 7 case. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)
(West 1993).
221d.
23Section 1328(a) of the Code defines the extent of a discharge in a chapter 13 case. Upon the comple-
tion of payments under the confirmed plan the debtor is entitled to a discharge of prepetition debts paid
under the plan, including debts of the type described under § 523(a), except for alimony and child support,
educational loans, and debts arising from the operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of iq-
uor or illegal drugs. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1328(a) (West Supp. 1993).
2411 U.S.C.A. § 522(b) (West 1993). Under § 522(b)(2) of the Code the debtor is only permitted to
retain exempt assets free from the claims of creditors. Id. Accordingly, all other prepetition assets are nonexempt
and are subject to liquidation by the trustee in bankruptcy in a chapter 7 case pursuant to § 704 of the
Code. Id. § 704. The debtor may have a choice between the federal exemptions under § 522(d), 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 522(d) (West 1993), or may be able to elect state defined exemptions, if the debtor's resident state has
not opted out of the federal exemptions as permitted under § 522(b)(2).
The federal exemptions and the state exemptions are limited to properties that are regarded as necessi-
ties of life, such as household goods, tools of the trade, and homestead properties. Moreover, the debtor's
right to these properties is limited in value. Most state exemptions are minimal, and because the majority
of the states have opted out of the federal exemptions there is little benefit to the debtor with significant
prepetition assets. See 3 COLLIER, supra note 16, § 522 for a discussion of exemptions under bankruptcy.
2 5WEINTRAUB & RESNICK, supra note 11, at 9-5.
26See 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d) as an example of the types of properties that may be claimed as exempt under
the Bankruptcy Code in cases where the debtor may elect federal exemptions. A complete listing of state
exemption laws can be found in 7 COLLIER, supra note 16.
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of exempt property is the debtor's home. Although homestead exemptions are
usually available to a debtor and are often generous in amount,27 chapter 13
relief remains important to the debtor whose home is encumbered by liens
against the home that are not avoidable under § 522(f) of the Code,28 and thus,
remain subject to creditor liens after bankruptcy.29 If a debtor seeks relief under
chapter 7 and has exempt property that is subject to an indefeasible lien that
survives bankruptcy, the creditor holding the lien may exercise his or her con-
tractual rights to foreclose against the property after the debtor has been dis-
charged and the case is closed.3o
Because home mortgages are not avoidable under § 522(f) of the Code and
survive bankruptcy, a debtor in a chapter 7 liquidation can only avoid the cred-
itor's ultimate foreclosure against the home after bankruptcy by either paying
off the mortgage, or by reaffirming the debt with the creditor and paying up
any arrearages. 31 The practicality of the debtor paying off the mortgage bal-
ance depends upon the debtor's ability to obtain refinancing of the mortgage,
which would most likely be at a premium due to higher interest rates charged
for such refinancing. Similarly, the debtor's ability to reaffirm the debt with
the origimal creditor depends upon whether the creditor is willing to enter into
a reaffirmation agreement with the debtor, and whether the terms of that agree-
ment are in the debtor's best interests. 32
In situations like this, chapter 13 relief becomes a very attractive option
for the debtor. By filing a petition for relief under chapter 13, a debtor may
27 Some of the largest homestead exemptions are in the following states: Alaska, Arizona, California,
Massachusetts, Nevada, North Dakota. 7 COLLIER, supra note 16. Collier includes the state exemption laws
for all fifty states.
2811 U.S.C.A. § 522(f) (West 1993).
29The purpose of exempt property is to assist the debtor in having a "fresh start" after the bankruptcy.
If the debtor is truly to enjoy the benefits of having exempt property, outstanding liens held by creditors
against such property must be avoidable. Section 522(0 permits the debtor to avoid certain liens against
exempt property. These liens includejuducial liens against all exempt property and nonpossessory nonpur-
chase money liens against personal property only. Accordingly, purchase money liens against personal property
and consensual liens against real property, such as mortgage liens, are not avoidable under this section of
the Code and survive bankruptcy. Id. See generally Margaret Howard, Multiple Judicial Liens in Bankruptcy:
Section 522(f) Simplified, 67 AM. BAuRu. LJ. 151 (1993).
30Although the debtor receives a discharge of personal liability for all prepetition debts under § 727(a)
of the Code in a chapter 7 liquidation, this discharge does not affect liens that creditors may have against
the debtor's assets. Section 506(d) provides for the preservation of liens against allowed secured claims that
have not been disallowed by the court or avoided under the Code. 11 U.S.C.A. § 506(d) (West 1993). The
Supreme Court recently ruled in Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992), that liens against a debtor's
real property may not be avoided under § 506(d) in a chapter 7 liquidation.
31A debtor that would otherwise receive a discharge from a debt may elect to reaffirm that debt if the
creditor is willing to do so. In such cases the reaffirmation agreement is negotiated between the parties prior
to the discharge, and it is an enforceable agreement if it is filed with the court and dearly represents a "fully
informed and voluntary agreement by the debtor" that does not "impose an undue hardship on the debtor
or a dependent of the debtor." The debtor has the right to rescind the agreement any time before discharge
or within sixty days after the agreement is filed with the court. 11 U.S.C.A. § 524(c), (d) (West 1993).
321d.
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prevent a foreclosure action taken by a home mortgage lender. Section 1322(b)(5)
of the Code enables the debtor to decelerate any prepetition defaults on a long,
term home mortgage by proposing to pay mortgage arrearages under the plan,
and enables the debtor to retain the home if the debtor remains current on
postpetition mortgage payments. 33 The debtor will remain personally liable for
the payments remaining due on the long-term debts, such as home mortgages,
that the debtor is unable to pay within the term of the plan. 34 Although §
1322(b)(2) permits a debtor to "modify" secured and unsecured claims, which
usually results in a readjustment of the payment terms of the original contract, 35
this right to modify claims does not include "claim[sl secured only by a secu-
rity interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence.' 36
Accordingly, chapter 13 gives the debtor a chance to save the home from
an impending foreclosure by decelerating a defaulted loan, and by permitting
a cure of the default under the plan. At the same time, chapter 13 gives pro-
tection to the debtor's creditor, who holds a claim secured by a mortgage against
the debtor's home, by requiring that all postpetition installments be paid in accor-
dance with the terms of the mortgage contract without any further modifica'
tion of the terms of the contract.
33Whenever a debtor seeks relief under the Bankruptcy Code, all collection efforts such as foreclosure
are stayed under § 362(a). 11 U.S.C.A. § 362 (West 1993). After filing the petition under chapter 13, the
debtor is required to propose a plan for the repayment of prepetition debts. Section 1322 of the Code lists
the requirements of a plan, which includes the submission of all future earnings or income of the debtor
to the trustee necessary for execution of the plan. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1322(a)(1) (West 1979). Under subsec-
tion (b)(5) of this provision, for long-term debts such as mortgages the plan may include proposals provid-
ing for the cure of any prepetition defaults and the maintenance of postpetition payments. 11 U.S.C.A. §
1322(b)(5) (West 1979).34The ordinary maximum term allowed for a chapter 13 plan is three years. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1322(c) (West
1979). The bankruptcy court may approve a plan for up to five years upon a finding of"cause" The terms
of most home mortgages well exceed these limits, and most debtors are not able to repay a home mortgage
within the plan term. Accordingly, § 1322(b)(5) permits the debtor with a long-term claim to bring current
the arrearages under the plan and to continue postpetition mortgage payments during the plan and beyond,
until the mortgage is repaid. Although § 1328 entities a debtor to a discharge of prepetition debts upon
completion of the plan, that discharge does not include the debtor's liability under the long-term debts remain-
ing unpaid after the plan has expired. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1328 (West 1979 & Supp. 1993).
35Section 1322(b)(2) provides:
[T]he plan may-
(2) modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only
by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence, or of
holders of unsecured claims, or leave unaffected the rights of holders of any class of
claims ....
This right to modify qualifying debts is significant for the debtor, because he or she can propose a plan that
may readjust the amount to be paid in installments through a reduction or extension of the installment pay-
ments under the plan. However, the right to modify does not extend to claims that are secured only by
real property that is the debtor's primary residence. What this means for the debtor is that he or she can
seek relief under chapter 13 to stop a creditor from exercising foreclosure rights, but the plan can only cure
the default and cannot propose a further readjustment of the claim held by a lender that is only secured
by the debtor's home.
361,1_
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Until the mid-1980's, most home mortgage lenders could expect their claims
to be protected from modification under chapter 13. However, with the drop-
ping property values that occurred throughout many parts of the country during
the 1980's, some mortgage holders found claims that had once been fully secured
had become undersecured. In cases like this, debtors attempted to divide these
claims against their homes into "secured" and "unsecured" claims as defined
by § 506(a) of the Code,37 and proposed modifications of the unsecured por-
tions of these claims as allowed modifications under § 1322(b)(2).38 If this was
permitted by the bankruptcy courts, it typically meant that the debtor's reor-
ganization plan would propose that the creditor's claim be fully paid and pro-
tected against modification only to the extent of the actual value of the creditor's
security in the property, and not for the full value of the outstanding debt.
This practice, commonly referred to as a "cramdown" has been vigorously
contested by many lenders, who have argued that the bifurcation of an underse-
cured mortgage into secured and unsecured portions is a prohibited modifica-
tion under § 1322(b)(2). Debtors have argued, to the contrary, that such a
bifurcation is not a prohibited modification under § 1322(b)(2), because the
only claim that is protected from modification thereunder is the "secured claim"
and not the "unsecured claim," as defined under § 506(a) of the Code. Accord-
ingly, the courts have been faced with the task of determining whether a pro-
posed plan is in compliance with the anti-modification provisions of§ 1322(b)(2),
if the plan includes a reclassification of an undersecured residential mortgage
into a secured claim and an unsecured claim pursuant to § 506(a). Or, to put
the question more directly on point, are the provisions of § 506 applicable to
determinations made under § 1322(b)(2) of the Code?
III. THE RELEVANT LAW GOVERNING MODIFICATION AND
BIFURCATION UNDER A CHAPTER 13 PLAN: PROVISIONS
IN CONFLICT OR CONGRUENCE?
Section 1322 of the Code is the provision in chapter 13 that governs the
contents of the debtor's readjustment plan, and dictates what the debtor must
711 U.S.C.A. § 506(a) (West 1993).
38Moreover, in some cases, the debtors seeking to reclassify the undersecured claim as both a secured
claim and an unsecured claim have also gone so far as to assert that the lien or mortgage held by the credi-
tor should also be avoided to the extent of the value of the unsecured claim pursuant to the lien avoidance
provision of § 506(d). This section provides that:
To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed
secured, such lien is void unless-
(1) such claim was disallowed only under section 502(b)(2) or 506(e) of this title; or
(2) such claim is not an allowed secured claim due only to the failure of an entity
to file a proof of such claim under section 501 of this title.
11 U.S.C.A. § 506(d) (West 1993). Accordingly, it is argued that, since § 506(d) permits the avoidance
of claims that are not "allowed secured claims," the "unsecured" portion of the creditor's claim against the
debtor's home should be avoidable.
1993)
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or may propose under the plan in order for the plan to be confirmed. 39 Under
subsection (a) of this provision, the debtor is required to submit all of the debtor's
future earnings or income to the trustee for distribution to the debtor's credi-
tors for the duration of the plan, to provide for the full payment of priority claims,
and to treat all claims within a class similarly.40
Subsection (b) of § 1322 instructs the debtor on how creditor claims may
be treated under the plan. 41 The provision that is most useful to the debtor
under § 1322(b) is found under paragraph (2). It provides that the debtor may:
modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a
claim secured only by a security interest in real property that
3911 U.S.C.A. § 1322 (West 1979 & Supp. 1993).40Section 1322 provides:
(a) The plan shall-
(1) provide for the submission of all or such portion of future earnings or other
future income of the debtor to the supervision and control of the trustee as is neces-
sary for the execution of the plan;
(2) provide for the full payment, in deferred cash payments, of all claims entitled
to priority under section 507 of this title, unless the holder of a particular claim agrees
to a different treatment of such claim; and
(3) if the plan classifies claims, provide the same treatment for each claim within
a particular class.
11 U.S.C.A. § 1322(a) (West 1979 & Supp. 1993).
4111 U.S.C.A. § 1322(b) (West Supp. 1993) provides:
Subject to subsections (a) and (c) of this section, the plan may-
(1) designate a class or classes of unsecured claims; as provided in section 1122
of this title, but may not discriminate unfairly against any class so designated; however,
such plan may treat claims for a consumer debt of the debtor if an individual is liable
on such consumer debt with the debtor differently than other unsecured claims;
(2) modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only
by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence, or of
holders of unsecured claims, or leave unaffected the rights of holders of any class of
claims;
(3) provide for the curing or waiving of any default;
(4) provide for payments on any unsecured claim to be made concurrently with
payments on any secured claim or other unsecured claim;
(5) notwithstanding paragraph (2) of this subsection, provide for the curing of
any default within a reasonable time and maintenance of payments while the case
is pending on any unsecured claim or secured claim on which the last payment is due
after the date on which the final payment under the plan is due;
(6) provide for the payment of all or any part of any claim allowed under section
1305 of this title;
(7) subject to section 365 of this title, provide for the assumption, rejection, or
assignment of any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor not previously
rejected under such section;
(8) provide for the payment of all or part of a claim against the debtor from prop-
erty of the estate or property of the debtor;
(9) provide for the vesting of property of the estate, on confirmation of the plan
or at a later time, in the debtor or in any other entity; and
(10) include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with this title.
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is the debtor's principal residence, or of holders of unsecured
claims, or leave unaffected the rights of holders of any class
of claims.42
It is through this provision that chapter 13 relief achieves great efficacy and
substance. The debtor's ability to modify the terms of prepetition debts that
have become too onerous to satisfy, as originally contracted, is an invaluable
feature of debt readjustment under chapter 13. The right to modify the debt
permits the debtor to propose a change in the original contract payment terms,
including a reduction in installment payments or the interest rate, or a change
in the due date of the contract.
As the language states, the debtor may modify the rights of holders of
secured and unsecured claims. However, this right to modify claims under para-
graph (2) does not include "claims secured only by a security interest in real
property that is the debtor's principal residence " 43 Accordingly, claims that
may be modified under § 1322(b)(2) include unsecured claims and claims secured
by property other than, or in addition to, a debtor's principal residence.44 Thus,
the Code provides a special protection against modification of claims held by
lenders holding mortgages only against the debtor's home.
The exception to the modification of claims secured only by a debtor's prin-
cipal residence is the result of a compromise between the House and Senate
concerning the extent to which the debtor should be permitted to modify claims
under chapter 13. 45 The House version of what is now § 1322(b)(2) provided
4211 U.S.C.A. § 1322(b)(2) (West Supp. 1993).
43This ability to modify is optional. That is, the debtor is not required to modify claims but has the
right to do so if necessary for rehabilitation under the plan See id.
44Collier provides the following description of the extent of the debtor's right to modify secured claims
under § 1322(b)(2):
A claim secured by any other real property or by personal property of the estate
or of the debtor, or by the property of another may be modified by the chapter 13
plan. Creditors sometimes demand real property and personal property to secure the
same debt. Even purchase money mortgages often take additional security interests
in appliances, furniture and other personalty. Other creditors may have security
interests in other real property, rents, escrow accounts, bank accounts, motor vehi-
cles or insurance proceeds and premium refunds. All such claims may be modified
by a chapter 13 plan, and a creditor may not protect its claim from modification by
relinquishing its other liens after a bankruptcy is filed. A claim secured by a lien other
than a security interest, on real estate that is the debtor's principal residence, may
also be modified by a chapter 13 plan.
A claim secured by a security in the principal residence of the debtor may be
modified, unless the residence constitutes real property. A mobile home, for instance,
often does not constitute real property under applicable nonbankruptcy law.
5 COLLmER, supra note 16, 1322.06, at 1322-15 - 16.
45Senator DeConcini stated:
Section (b)(2)... represents a compromise agreement between similar provisions
in the House bill and Senate amendment. Under the House amendment, the plan
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that the plan could "modify the rights of holders of secured claims or holders
of unsecured claims."' 6 Contrary to this unrestricted right to modify claims,
the Senate version of the same provision provided that the plan could "modify
the rights of holders of secured claims (other than claims wholly secured by
mortgages on real property) or of holders of unsecured claims."4 7
Accordingly, the House version granted the debtor flexibility in readjust-
ing all debts, whereas the Senate had offered the debtor limited authority for
modification and provided all real estate mortgage holders with protection
against modification of their contracts with the debtor. The compromise under
the Code was to limit only the debtor's right to modify the claims of holders
of residential real estate mortgages. This compromise reflected a desire by Con-
gress to protect the home mortgage industry from having its claims modified
under the plan.4 8
Although the debtor may not propose a modification of the contract terms
of these protected mortgages, § 1322(b)(5) does permit the debtor to propose
a "cure" of any prepetition default on the mortgages. 49 Section 1322(b)(5) spe-
cifically provides that the debtor may:
notwithstanding paragraph (2) of this subsection, provide for the
curing of any default within a reasonable time and maintenance
of payments while the case is pending on any unsecured claim
or secured claim on which the last payment is due after the
date on which the final payment under the plan is due.50
Accordingly, debtors of long-term debts, like the typical home mortgage, may
save their homes from foreclosure by proposing to cure any prepetition default
under the plan and maintaining postpetition mortgage installments.5' By electing
may modify the rights of holders of secured claims other than a claim secured by a
security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence. It is intended
that a claim secured by the debtor's principal residence may be treated with under
section 1322(b)(5) of the House amendment.
124 Cong. Rec. S 17404, 17424 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6505, 6550 [hereinafter Statement of Sen. DeConcini].
46H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. at 537 (1977), reprinted in App. 3 COLLIER, supra note 16, at II-1
(15th ed. 1992).
47S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. at 572-573 (1978), reprinted in App. 3 COLLIER, supra note 16, at VII-1.
S811 U.S.C.A. § 1322(b)(2) (West Supp. 1993).
49Section 1322(b)(3) also permits the debtor to cure or waive defaults on unsecured and secured claims
that are subject to modification under § 1322(b)(2). 11 U.S.C.A. § 1322(b)(3) (West Supp. 1993). Cases
determining that a cure under § 1322 does not constitute a modification under § 1322(b)(2) include Grubbs
v. Houston First American Sav. Ass'n, 730 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1984); DiPierro v. Taddeo (In re Taddeo),
685 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1982).
5011 U.S.C.A. § 1322(b)(5) (West 1979).
"'Collier describes the practical application of § 1322(b)(5) for all debtors under chapter 13:
Section 1322(b)(5) is concerned with relatively long term debt, such as a secu-
rity interest or mortgage on the residence of the debtor. It permits the debtor to take
advantage of a contract repayment period which is longer than the chapter 13 extension
(Vol. 67
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to cure the prepetition default on the long-term mortgage under § 1322(b)(5),
the debtor is also able to take advantage of the long-term payment schedule
of the mortgage contract for postpetition installments.52 At the same time, the
creditor's mortgage remains protected from modification as provided under
§ 1322(b)(2), and the debt is excepted from discharge under § 1328(a)(1) of
the Code.53
The addition of§ 1322(b)(5) responded to a critical limitation under chapter
XIII of the Bankruptcy Act. Under the Act, claims secured by-real property
could not be affected by the debtor's plan, because § 606(1) of the Act specifi-
cally excluded such claims from the definition of "claims".54 In spite of this exclu-
sion, it became the practice of the bankruptcy courts to grant a chapter XIII
debtor injunctive relief against a creditor attempting to foreclose a lien against
the debtor's real property securing the claim. 5-This relief enabled the debtor
period which may not exceed five years under any circumstances, and may be essen-
tial ifthe debtor cannot pay the full allowed secured claim over the term of the plan.
The right to cure defaults on long term contracts applies to all long term debt and
thus covers contracts such as land installment sale agreements as well as mortgages.
The debtor may not cure a default under this section if the debt matures earliei
than the due date for the final plan payment. Thus, where a large final balloon pay-
ment is due on a debt prior to the termination of the plan section 1322(b)(5) may
not be utilized and a debtor must look to other Code sections, usually section
1322(b)(3), to cure a default.
Although section 1322(b)(5) is not limited to secured or residential loans, its most
common use by far is to cure defaults on residential mortgages. It may be utilized
to cure postpetition defaults as well as prepetition defaults.... It may also be utilized
in cases in which the debtor has no personal liability on the claim, since the term
"claim" in the Bankruptcy Code is construed to include a claim against the debtor's
property....
The debtor may maintain the contract payments during the course of the plan,
without acceleration by virtue of any prepetition default, by proposing to cure the
default within a reasonable time. The debtor may avail himself or herself of the pro.
visions of section 1322(b)(5) even though the long term debt is secured only by a
security interest in real property which is the principal residence of the debtor.
5 COLLIER, supra note 16, 1322.09[1], at 1322-20 (footnotes omitted).
-12d. at 1322.09[4].
5"Section 1328(a)(1) provides for the discharge of the debtor upon the completion of his or her perfor-
mance under the plan:
(a) As soon as practicable after completion by the debtor of all payments under
the plan, unless the court approves a written waiver of discharge executed by the
debtor after the order for relief under this chapter, the court shall grant the debtor
a discharge of all debts provided for by the plan or disallowed under section 502 of
this title, except any debt-
(1) provided for under section 1322(b)(5) of this title ....
11 U.S.C.A. § 1328(a)(1) (West Supp. 1993). For a discussion of discharge of long-term debts under chap-
ter 13 see 5 COLLIER, supra note 16, 1322.09[4], 1328.01[1]d][iil.
5411 U.S.C. § 606(1) (1970), (repealed 1978), reprinted in App. 1 COLLIER, supra note 16, pt. 1 at 244.
35According to the Report of Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws:
[Slection 614 of the Act authorizes the court to "enjoin or stay until final decree any
act or the commencement or continuation of any proceeding to enforce any lien upon
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to cure the default on the claim, to resume and maintain payments under the
original debt, and thus to avoid foreclosure by the creditor. Section 1322(b)(5)
represents a codification of the relief as recommended to Congress by the Com-
mission on the Bankruptcy Laws.5 6
In order for a plan with proposed modifications of secured or unsecured
claims to be confirmed by the court, it must meet the requirements of § 1325
of the Code: 7 If a plan providing for the modification of claims is to be con-
firmed, it must propose to pay the unsecured creditors no less than what they
would receive in a chapter 7 liquidation,58 and it must propose to pay the secured
creditor the present value of the creditor's interest in the property securing
the property of the debtor:' Literally, this provision enables the court to enjoin the
enforcement of any lien whether or not it secured a debt dealt with by the plan, and
indeed, whether or not the plan could deal with such debt. The courts have given
liberal construction to this injunctive power vested in the court. Foreclosures of mort
gages on real estate as well as enforcement of security interests in personal property
have been enjoined by bankruptcy courts pursuant to this provision, and such injunc-
tions have been sustained though subjected to limitations affording protection to the
secured creditors enjoined.
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I at 165-66 (1973) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT], reprinted
in App. 2 COLLIER, supra note 16, pt. I.
16CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 55, pt. I at 165-66; pt. II at 204. For a summary of the Commission
report and history of § 1322(b)(5) see 5 COLLIER, supra note 16, 1322.09121.
57Section 1325 provides that the following requirements must be met in order for a plan to be confirmed
by the court:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the court shall confirm a plan if-
(1) the plan complies with the provisions of this chapter and with the other applica-
ble provisions of this title;
(2) any fee, charge, or amount required under chapter 123 of title 28, or by the
plan, to be paid before confirmation has been paid;
(3) the plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden
by law;
(4) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed
under the plan on account of each allowed unsecured claim is not less than the amount
that would be paid on such claim if the estate of the debtor were liquidated under
chapter 7 of this title on such date;
(5) with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the plan-
(A) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan;
(B)(i) the plan provides that the holder of such claim retain the lien securing
such claim; and
(ii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed
under the plan on account of such is not less that the allowed amount of such
claim; or
(C) the debtor surrenders the property securing such claim to such holder; and
(6) the debtor will be able to make all payments under the plan and comply with
the plan.
11 U.S.C.A. § 1325 (West 1979 & Supp. 1993). For a detailed discussion of the confirmation requirements
of § 1325 and its legislative history see 5 COLLIER, supra note 16, 1325.01.
5811 U.S.C.A. § 1325(a)(4) (West 1979). For a description of the requirements for confirmation under
§ 1325(a)(4) see 5 COLLER, supra note 16, 1325.05.
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the creditor's claim.59 However, the requirements of § 1325(a)(5) governing the
treatment of secured claims do not apply to claims that are not modified under
the plan or "provided for under the plan" such as claims held by home mort-
gage holders that are protected from modification under § 1322(b)(2).60 So long
as the requirements of § 1325 are met, the plan may be confirmed by the
bankruptcy court and will not require any additional vote of acceptance or
approval by the creditors affected.61
The other provision that is relevant to the application of § 1322(b)(2) is
subsection (a) of§ 506 of the Code,62 defining which claims in bankruptcy are
deemed to be secured or unsecured. 63 Section 506 is a provision of general appli-
9Supra note 57.
60Collier states:
Section 1325(a)(5) applies only to allowed secured claims provided for by the plan.
Although the term "provided for by the plan" is not defined by the Code or in its
legislative history, the intended meaning seems clear enough. A chapter 13 plan may,
but need not, modify the rights of most holders of secured claims. Since a plan need
not modify allowed secured claims, it is discretionary with the debtor whether to
make provision in the chapter 13 plan for allowed secured claims. In the event the
plan makes no provisions for one or more allowed secured claims, the plan is to be
confirmed by the court regardless of its acceptance or rejection by holders of allowed
secured claims not provided for by the plan without any other showing being required
under section 1325(a)(5).
5 COLLIER, supra note 16, 1325.06[2][b] at 1325-36 - 37 (footnotes omitted).
61n its decision to revise the bankruptcy laws in 1970, Congress appointed a Commission to study practice
under the Bankruptcy Act. In its study of experiences under chapter XIII of the Act, the Commission found
that debtors were not using chapter XIII with any consistency nationwide. The Commission found many
reasons for this, including how secured creditor's claims could and could not be affected by a proposed plan
of readjustment and the veto power that creditors had over the plan:
The provisions of Chapter XIII respecting secured creditors have limited the use-
fulness of the chapter. The first difficulty arises out of the fact that a Chapter XIII
plan cannot deal with any claim secured by real property. The result is that although
a petitioner is frequently obliged to make installment payments on a real estate mort-
gage or contract for the purchase of his home, the plan itself cannot deal with that
indebtedness.... The other difficulty arises out of the provisions of Chapter XIII
that in effect give each creditor secured by personal property the right to veto any
feature of a plan that affects his interest as a secured creditor, without regard to the
reasonableness of the provision made for the secured creditor. The courts have gone
so far as to give a secured creditor his right of veto without regard to the fact that
the secured creditor may be largely unsecured because of the deficiency of the col-
lateral to cover his debt.
CMMISSION REPORT, supra note 55, pt. I at 13.
The Commission's recommendations to eliminate these limitations were adopted in the form of §§
1322(b)(5) and 1325(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code, which permit a plan to include a debtor's "proposal for
paying debts secured by liens on his residence and curing defaults thereon within a reasonable time" and
"provisions for paying creditors secured by personal property, which protect their interest in the collateral,
without affording them a veto of any plan including them." Id. at 13-14.
6211 U.S.C.A. § 506(a) (West 1993).
63Section 506(d) has been used in many chapter 13 cases to support a debtor's plan proposing to avoid
a lien against the debtor's principal residence to the extent that the creditor's claim exceeds the value of
the property securing the claim. Subsection (d) of§ 506 provides for the avoidance of a lien to the extent
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cation under the Code and, like all other provisions under chapter 5, is relevant
in all bankruptcy cases, whether filed under chapter 7, 11, 12 or 13 of the Code. 64
Section 506(a) defines secured and unsecured claim as follows:
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property
in which the estate has an interest ... is a secured claim to
the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's
interest in such property ... and is an unsecured claim to the
extent that the value of such creditor's interest ... is less than
the amount of such allowed claim.65
The significance of § 506(a) is great in any bankruptcy petition where a
distinction between a creditor's claim as secured or unsecured is relevant in
determining the creditor's right to participate in asset distributions in a chap-
ter 7 liquidation, or the amounts that a creditor is to receive under a chapter
13 plan in order for the plan to qualify for confirmation. 66 Under § 1325 of the
that it does not secure a claim that is not an "allowed secured claim":
To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed
secured claim, such lien is void, unless-
(1) such claim was disallowed only under section 502(b)(5) or 502(e) of this title; or
(2) such claim is not an allowed secured claim due only to the failure of any entity
to file a proof of such claim under section 501 of this title.
The effect of the application of § 506(a) and (d) to the treatment of the undersecured mortgage against
the debtor's home is to protect the claim of the mortgage holder against modification only to the extent
that it is an "allowed secured claim:' and to preserve the lien against the home only to the extent of the
value of the "allowed secured claim:' Consequently, the unsecured portion of the claim may be modified
under the plan and the value of the creditor's lien against the debtor's home is reduced by the amount of
the unsecured portion of the claim. 11 U.S.C.A. § 506(a) and (d) (West 1993).
6"Section 103 of the Code states the rules of applicability of the various chapters under the Code. It
provides that "chapters 1, 3 and 5 of this title apply in a case under chapter 7, 11, 12 or 13 of this title."
11 U.S.C.A. § 103(a) (West 1993). Accordingly, § 506(a) is applicable to all cases filed under the above
numerated chapters of the Code. However, there is one specific exception to its application and that is found
under§ 1111(b)(1)(A). 11 U.S.C.A. § 1111(b)(1)(A) (Vest 1979). This provision permits a chapter 11 debtor
to elect to have the determination of the allowance of its secured claim to be governed by § 1111(b)(2) as
opposed to having it defined by § 506(a). Id. Under § 1111(b)(2) the debtor's secured claim is deemed "a
secured claim to the extent that such claim is allowed:' the effect of which is to avoid the bifurcation of
an undersecured claim into secured and unsecured components as required under § 506(a). 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 1111(b)(2) (West 1979).
6111 U.S.C.A. § 506(a) (West 1993).
66The effects of § 506(a) determinations under the Code are more broadly described in Collier:
The effect of such bifurcation may be of key importance in the course of a
bankruptcy case. The concept of adequate protection and numerous provisions of
the Code which afford important protection in respect of secured claims offer no,
or a lesser degree of, protection with respect to unsecured claims. Thus, issues as
to the application of section 506(a) may arise and be litigated in the context of requests
for relief from the automatic stay, demands for adequate protection, disputes as to
amounts required for redemption under section 722, requests by professionals for
interim or final allowance, and objections to confirmation of chapter 11, 12 and 13 plans.
3 COLLIER, supra note 16, at 506-04 at 506-16.
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Code, the holder of the unsecured claim must receive no less than what he
or she would have received in a chapter 7 liquidation, and the holder of the
secured claim must receive payments under the plan that are no less than the
value of the creditor's interest in the property securing the claim. 67 The rele-
vance of § 506(a) to the treatment of undersecured claims under the Code is
described in the legislative history:
Subsection (a) of [section 506] separates an undersecured cred-
itor's claim into two parts-he has a secured claim to the extent
of the value of his collateral; he has an unsecured claim for the
balance of his claim.... Throughout the bill, references to
secured claims are only to the claim determined to be secured
under this subsection, and not to the full amount of the cred-
itor's claim.68
As one commentator observes:
[S]ection 506(a) requires a bifurcation of a "partially secured"
or "undersecured" claim into separate and independent secured
claim and unsecured claim components.... [Tihe fact that
a secured claim and an unsecured claim are held by the same
creditor and are parts of what was originally a single liability
is not relevant in applying the other provisions of the Code,
and will not prevent substantial differentiation in treatment
and, where applicable, classification of the secured claim and
the unsecured claim. 69
Although the Code states that provisions under chapter 5 are applicable
to chapter 13 cases, 70 there is a split between the courts on whether § 506(a)
was intended to be applicable to § 1322(b)(2) for the purpose of dividing
undersecured home mortgages into secured and unsecured claims to determine
the limitations of the exception to modification of claims thereunder. The argu-
ments against the application of § 506(a) have been stated as follows:
(1) the legislative history mandates protection of the home
mortgage lender, and bifurcation impermissibly dilutes that pro-
tection; (2) as a matter of statutory construction, the require-
ments of a specific section, in this case section 1322(b)(2),
control those of a general section, in this case section 506(a);
67Supra note 57.
68H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess, 356 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6311.
693 Cor.uaT, supra note 16, 506.04 at 506-15 - 16 (footnotes omitted).
7011 U.S.C.A. § 103(a) (West 1993).
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(3) as a matter of statutory construction, the courts should
look to the definition of "claim" from section 101(4), which
includes both secured and unsecured claims, rather than the
definition of "secured claim" from section 506(a); and (4) anal-
ysis of the legislative history should look back to Chapter XIII
of the now-repealed Bankruptcy Act, predecessor to the Code,
for guidance in the definition of secured claims.71
The arguments employed by the courts taking the position that § 506(a)
is applicable to § 1322(b)(2), and permitting the separation of undersecured
home mortgages into secured and unsecured claims, are founded on similar
interpretive approaches. Many of these cases base their interpretation of
§§ 1322(b)(2) and 506(a) on four factors. First, the "plain meaning" of the
language of § 1322(b)(2) does not exclude the Code's definition of secured and
unsecured claims under § 506(a) from its application. Second, the legislative
history and intent indicate that the modification provision was a compromise
between the House and Senate, and provided limited protection to claims that
were only secured claims against a debtor's residence. Third, the rule of statu-
tory construction, that the provisions of a whole statute should be read with
consistency, requires the use of § 506(a) to determine the extent to which a
claim under § 1322(b) is entitled to protection against modification. Finally,
bankruptcy policy making chapter 13 relief available to more debtors and
providing a "fresh start" supports the application of § 506(a) to claims under
§ 1322(b)(2).72
The debate surrounding the relationship of § 506 to § 1322(b)(2) has
recently acquired a new dimension as a result of the Supreme Court's decision
in Dewsnup v. Timm. 73 In this decision the Court rendered an opinion on
whether a debtor in a chapter 7 case may reduce or "strip down" a lien held
by an undersecured creditor against the debtor's real property to its fair mar-
ket value. The Court held that a debtor could not strip down the lien by bifur-
cating the claim into unsecured and secured portions and avoiding the unsecured
portion of the claim pursuant to §§ 506(a) and (d) of the Code. It based its
opinion on the belief that the term "allowed secured claim" in § 506(a) did not
have the same meaning as the term is used in § 506(d), so as to permit the avoid-
ance of the unsecured portion of the undersecured claim. The Court did not
believe that, in enacting § 506(d), Congress intended to "depart from the pre-
Code rule that liens pass through bankruptcy unaffected;' where there is no
7'Eastland Mortgage Co. v. Hart (In re Hart), 923 F.2d 1410, 1414 (10th Cir. 1991) (synopsizing the
arguments against bifurcation).
72See supra Section III.
73112 S. Ct. 773 (1992).
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discussion in the legislative history of the Code to suggest such a departure
and the language of § 506 is ambiguous as to its relationship to other provi-
sions throughout the Code.74 Accordingly, a debtor may not avoid a creditor's
lien under § 506(d) simply because it is an "allowed unsecured claim" as opposed
to an "allowed secured claim" as defined under § 506(d); a debtor may only
avoid a secured claim if it is a disallowed claim pursuant to § 502 of the Code.75
Although the Court specifically stated that its interpretation of § 506 was
limited to the facts addressed in that case,76 many courts addressing the per-
missibility of bifurcation of undersecured claims in chapter 13 cases since Dews-
nup have added this decision to their deliberations on the applicability of § 506
to § 1322(b)(2), with varying results.77
Many pages of interesting arguments have been written on the what is
the correct reading of §§ 506 and 1322(b)(2) of the Code, and have provoked
the questions that are considered in this article:
1. Which side of the debate is correct in its interpretation of
section 1322(b)(2) based on the language of the provision, the
legislative history, rules of statutory construction, and the fun-
damental principles of bankruptcy law?
2. Have proposed legislative amendments to section
1322(b)(2) supported or offended the basic equitable princi-
ples of bankruptcy law, or represented a fair and reasonable
extension of bankruptcy protection to the home mortgage
industry or an inequitable preference to a special interest
group?
The following analysis of the cases addressing this issue is designed to bring
the different interpretations of § 1322(b)(2) into focus to help facilitate an under-
standing of this provision, which is so critical to the extent of relief available
to debtors under chapter 13, and the appropriateness of legislative revision.
IV. INTERRELATIONSHIP OF §§ 1322(b)(2) and 506: JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION
The division among the courts on whether a debtor may use subsection
(a) of§ 506 to bifurcate residential mortgages into secured and unsecured claims
under § 1322(b)(a) has reached the Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third,




77See infra notes 183-234 and accompanying text.
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in the First, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits.78 The Courts
of Appeals for the Second, Third, Ninth and Tenth Circuits have each agreed
that the bifurcation of such claims is permissible under § 1322(b)(2) of the Code,
and the secured portion of an undersecured claim is the only part of the claim
to be accorded protection against modification thereunder.79 The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has taken the contrary position, that the bifur
cation of residential home mortgages is not permitted under § 1322(b)(2).80
The lower courts in the remaining circuits that have addressed this issue have
also divided as to whether bifurcation of such claims is permissible in chapter
13 cases. The following survey of case law reviews the two opposing views
on this interpretive question separately. Each position is described according
78Nobleman v. American Say. Bank (In re Nobleman), 968 F.2d 483 (5th Cir.) cert. granted, 113 S. Ct.
654 (1992); Bellamy v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re Bellamy), 962 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1992);
Eastland Morgage Co. v. Hart (In re Hart), 923 F.2d 1410 (10th Cir. 1991); Wilson v. Commonwealth Mort-
gage Corp., 895 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1990); Hougland v. Lomas & Nettleton Co. (In re Hougland), 886 F.2d
1182 (9th Cir. 1989); Sapos v. Provident Institution of Savings, 967 F.2d 918 (3d Cir. 1992); Alaska Hous.
Fin. Corp. v. Love, 943 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1991); In re Dyer, 142 B.R. 364 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1992); In re Govan,
139 B.R. 1017 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1992); In re Ireland, 137 B.R. 65 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992); In re Davidoff,
136 B.R. 567 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992); In re Weber, 140 B.R. 707 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992); In re Sainz-Dean,
139 B.R. 739 (Bankr. D. Colo.), aff'd, 143 B.R. 784 (D. Colo. 1992); Taras v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp.
(In re Thras), 136 B.R. 941 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992); Harris v. Barclay's American Mortgage Corp. (In re Harris),
1992 WL 33843 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992); In re Lopez, 138 B.R. 348 (Bankr. D. P.R. 1992); Lomas Mortgage
USA v. Roberts, 137 B.R. 343 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1992); Zeigler v. Lomas & Nettleton Co. (In re Zeigler),
1992 WL 50006 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992); In re Strober, 136 B.R. 614 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992); Linzmeier v.
Bull's Eye Credit Union (In re Linzmeier), 138 B.R. 59 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1991); In re Lee, 137 B.R. 285
(Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1991); In re Hussman, 133 B.R. 490 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991); In re Burgess, 138 B.R. 56
(Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1991); Loader v. Chariton Credit Union (In re Loader), 128 B.R. 13 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1991); Wright v. C & S Family Credit, Inc. (In re Wright), 128 B.R. 838 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991); In re Ses-
sion, 128 B.R. 147 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1991); In re Brouse, 110 B.R. 539 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990); In re Moore,
113 B.R. 239 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990); In re Gadson, 114 B.R. 453 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990); In re Honett,
116 B.R. 495 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1990); Boullion v. Sapp (In re Boullion), 123 B.R. 549 (Bankr. WD. Tex.
1990); In re Christiansen, 121 B.R. 63 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990); In re Chavez, 117 B.R. 733 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1990); In re Sauber, 115 B.R. 197 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990); In re Schum, 112 B.R. 159 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1990); In re Demoff, 109 B.R. 902 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989); In re Ross, 107 B.R. 759 (Bankr. W.D. Okla.
1989); In re Hill, 96 B.R. 809 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989); In re Frost, 96 B.R. 804 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989),
aff'd, 123 B.R. 254 (S.D. Ohio 1990); In re Harris, 94 B.R. 832 (D.N.J. 1989); Kessler v. Homestead Say.
(In re Kessler), 99 B.R. 635 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989); In re Kaczmarczyk, 107 B.R. 200 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989);
Roberts v. Skiba (In re Roberts), 99 B.R. 653 (Bankr. WD. Pa. 1989); Kehm v. Citicorp Homeowners Serv.,
Inc. (In re Kehm), 90 B.R. 117 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); In re Shaffer, 84 B.R. 63 (Bankr. W.D. Va.), aff'd,
Capital Credit Plan, Inc. v. Shaffer, 116 B.R. 60 (W.D. Va. 1988); In re Russell, 93 B.R. 703 (D.N.D. 1988);
In re Brown, 91 B.R. 19 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988); In re Simmons, 78 B.R. 300 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1987); Caster
v. United States (In re Caster), 77 B.R. 8 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987); In re Jablonski, 70 B.R. 381 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1987), aff'd in part and remanded in part, 88 B.R. 652 (E.D. Pa. 1988); In re Catlin, 81 B.R. 522 (Bankr.
D. Minn. 1987); In re Hemsing, 75 B.R. 689 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987); In re Hynson, 66 B.R. 246 (Bankr.
D.N.J. 1986); In re Foster, 61 B.R. 492 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1986); Cameron Brown Co. v. Bruce (In re Bruce),
40 B.R. 884 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1984); In re Neal, 10 B.R. 535 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981).
79Lomas Mortgage USA v. Wiese, 980 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir. 1992); Bellamy, 962 F.2d 179; Hart, 923
F.2d 1410; Wilson, 895 F.2d 123; Hougland, 886 F.2d 1182.
"°Nobleman, 968 F.2d 483.
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to the various methods of statutory interpretation used by the courts to sup-
port their interpretive conclusions regarding the interrelationship of§ 1322(b)(2)
and § 506.
A. CASES PERMITTING THE BIFURCATION OF UNDERSECURED MORTGAGES
UNDER CHAPTER 13
1. Plain Language
Several of the courts finding bifurcation of the undersecured mortgage per-
missible under chapter 13 have based these opinions on the "plain language"
of § 506 and § 1322.81 When applying the anti-modification provision of
§ 1322(b)(2) to home mortgages, these courts have held that, when determin-
ing the extent to which a mortgage is a "secured claim", one must apply
§ 506(a).82 Some courts have also permitted the use of § 506(d) to avoid that
portion of the home mortgage lien that was not secured.8 3
This interpretation of the Code has been supported by several arguments.
The court in In re Demoff8 4 stated:
The phrase "modify the rights of holders of secured claims"
immediately before the phrase "other than a claim secured only
by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's prin-
cipal residence, .... "in section 1322(b)(2) clearly indicates
that the later phrase refers to the prior phrase, and that only
the secured claim portion of the claim as defined in section
506(a) is protected from modification.8 5
Several courts have found the use of§ 506 to define the "secured claim" is sup-
ported by the fact that § 103(a) of the Code specifically provides that the pro-
visions of chapter 5 of the Code are applicable to chapter 7, 9, 11, 12 and 13
cases.
8 6
In Eastland Mortgage Co. v. Hart (In re Hart)8 7 the Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit read the language of the two provisions to be clear and not
in conflict with one another:
In interpreting any statute we "'begin with the language
81Hart, 923 F.2d 1410; Wilson, 895 F.2d 123; Hougland, 886 F.2d 1182; Brouse, 110 B.R. 539; Demoff,
109 B.R. 902; Ross, 107 B.R. 759; Kehm, 90 B.R. 117; Simmons, 78 B.R. 300.
82Hart, 923 F.2d 1410; Wilson, 895 F.2d 123; Hougland, 886 F.2d 1182; Brouse, 110 B.R. 539; Demoff,
109 B.R. 902; Ross, 107 B.R. 759; Kehm, 90 B.R. 117; Simmons, 78 B.R. 300.
83Brouse, 110 B.R. at 543; Demoff, 109 B.R. at 919.
84109 B.R. 902 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989).
85Id. at 919.
S6Demoff, 109 B.R. at 919. Also see Hart, 923 F.2d at 1414; Wilson, 895 F.2d at 128; Hougland, 886
F.2d at 1185.
87923 F.2d 1410 (10th Cir. 1991).
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employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary
meaning of that language accurately express the legislative pur-
pose."' "The plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive,
except in the 'rare cases [in which] the literal application of
a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the
intention of its drafters'" In addition, using a literal reading
of 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) is less speculative and less quasi-
legislative than attempting to ferret its meaning from its legis-
lative history, which, as we have seen is not-clear enough with
respect to this issue to show a "demonstrably" different con-
gressional intent than that indicated by the plain meaning of
the statute itself.
We find nothing in the plain language of§ 1322(b)(2) which
instructs us to go beyond the Code's statutory definition of
the term "secured claims" to protect the unsecured portion of
an undersecured home mortgage.88
Similarly, views regarding the clarity of the plain language of§ 1322(b)(2) were
also expressed by the Courts of Appeals for the Third and Ninth Circuits.89
One of the most distinctive readings of the plain language of § 1322(b)(2)
was provided by the court in Kehm v. Citicorp Homeowners Service, Inc. (In
re Kehm). 90 It read § 1322(b)(2) as only prohibiting "a plan from creating
certain modifications" and that § 1322(b)(2) did not "prohibit modifications
occurring as a result of procedures or vehicles other than the plan"'91 The court
stated:
Section 1322(b)(2) clearly distinguishes between (1) holders
of secured claims, whose rights may be modified; (2) holders
of claims secured by a debtor's principal residence, whose rights
may not be modified, and (3) holders of unsecured claims,
whose rights may not be [sic] modified. The only logical,
semantic interpretation of this section is that the § 1322(b)(2)
S8Id. at 1415 (citations omitted).
s
9Wilson, 895 F.2d at 127 ('To the extent that the issue remains open, we hold today that section
1322(b)(2) does not preclude the modification of any 'unsecured' portion of an undersecured claim. Com-
monwealth points us to no language of the statute which is inconsistent with such a construction.... In
determining the meaning of any statute, the words of the statute are 'the primary, and ordinarily the most
reliable, source of interpreting' its meaning."); Hougland, 886 F.2d at 1183 ("There are times when the quest
for meaning should begin and end 'with the language of the statute itself United States v. Ron Pair Enter.,
109 S. Ct. at 1030. This is one of those times.")
9090 B.R. 117 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988).
91Id. at 120.
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prohibition against modification is limited to fully secured
claims.92
The court read § 506 as providing the "process by which we determine whether
a claim is in fact secured."93 Accordingly, any creditor's objection to the use
of§ 506(a) in determining its secured claim for purposes of§ 1322(b)(2) could
not be regarded as a valid objection against the plan as much as an objection
against the "section 506 process which is the prerequisite to the presentation
of an effective plan' 94
2. Legislative History
The decisions that rely on legislative history and intent to support the bifur-
cation of undersecured claims against a debtor's principal residence under
§ 1322(b)(2) focus primarily on (1) the statutory evolution of§ 1322(b)(2); (2)
the legislative intent behind § 1322(b)(2), to provide special protection for
residential mortgages under chapter 13; and (3) the significance of § 506(a),
and the distinction made between secured and unsecured claims throughout
the Code. Virtually all of the cases considering the legislative history of§ 1322
begin their analysis with a discussion of the evolution of the provision as a com-
promise between the House and Senate. 95
These cases generally note that the House version of§ 1322(b)(2) proposed
a broad grant of power to debtors to restructure any secured or unsecured claim
under a chapter 13 plan, including those claims secured by real property. In
contrast, the Senate version protected claims secured "wholly" by real prop-
erty from restructuring or modification under chapter 13.96 The cases describe
the final version as a compromise that limited the protection against modifica-
tion to claims secured "only" by a debtor's principal residence, and emphasize
that the legislative history offers no explanation as to any significance in the
substitution of the word "only" for "wholly".97 Thus, it is generally concluded
that the extent of the protection against modification is limited to claims




9XVilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1990); Loader v. Chariton Credit
Union (In re Loader), 128 B.R. 13 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991); In re Demoff, 109 B.R. 902 (Bankr. N.D. Ind.
1989); In re Harris, 94 B.R. 832 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1989); In re Simmons, 78 B.R. 300 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1987);
Cameron Brown Co. v. Bruce (In re Bruce), 40 B.R. 884 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1984); In re Neal, 10 B.R. 535
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981).
96Wilson, 895 F.2d at 127-28; Loader, 128 B.R. at 15; Demoff, 109 B.R. at 906-07; Harris, 94 B.R. at
835-36; Simmons, 78 B.R. at 301-02 (quoting Neal, 10 B.R. at 538-39); Neal, 10 B.R. at 538-39.
97Wilson, 895 F.2d at 128; Loader, 128 B.R. at 15; Dernoff, 109 B.R. at 920; Harris, 94 B.R. at 836;
Simmons, 78 B.R. at 302-03; Bruce, 40 B.R. at 886-87; Neal, 10 B.R. at 536-40.
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under § 506(a). 98 The court in In re Harris99 stated:
The compromise version, in relevant part, changed the
"wholly" in the Senate version to "only" which resulted in the
final form of§ 1322(b)(2) that the plan may "modify the rights
of holders of secured claims other than a claim secured only
by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's prin-
cipal residence... . It is clear that this version represents the
intent of Congress to protect home mortgage lenders. How,
ever, it remains unclear whether those lenders must hold secured
claims under the § 506 definition to be afforded protection."'0
Reservations about the extent of protection against modification were simi-
larly expressed by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Wilson v.
Commonwealth Mortgage Corporation:"o'
The final version of section 1322(b)(2) was contained in
a House amendment and was characterized by the legislative
leaders as "compromise agreement." This final version limited
the exception to home mortgages rather than any real estate
mortgage, as would have been provided by the Senate version.
Presumably, the compromise was between those for the House
version who supported unrestricted modification on behalf of
Chapter 13 debtors and those for the Senate version which
excepted certain real estate mortgages from modification. The
slight difference in language in the exclusionary phrase between
the Senate's version ("wholly secured") and that ultimately
adopted ("secured only") does not appear to have been given
any significance. Thus, although it is clear that the anti,
modification provision of the Act was inserted on behalf of the home
mortgage industry, the fact that the provision itself was a com-
promise suggests that the residential mortgage providers did not
emerge with all the protection they may have sought.02
Related to this discussion of the legislative history and intent behind § 1322,
several courts have described the anti-modification clause in § 1322(b)(2) as
a congressional reaction to fears that, if debtors were allowed to readjust all
types of secured debts, including home mortgage loans, this would severely
affect the stability of the home mortgage finance industry and the availability
9 See cases cited in note 97, supra.
9994 B.R. 832 (D.NJ. 1989).
100Id. at 836 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
-1895 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1990).
1021d. at 128 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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of financing by the industry to consumers. 0 3 Some courts have interpreted the
protection against modification in a narrow way, and have adopted the view
that Congress intended to limit the protection to long-term home mortgages
as opposed to short-term loans that are secured by a debtor's principal resi-
dence.o4 However interpreted, the courts have concluded that the protection
afforded the home mortgage industry was intended to cover the fully secured
claim from modification, and that the right to modify under § 1322(b)(2) would
include the unsecured portion of the home mortgagee's claim.Yo5
In order to complete the analysis of the legislative history supporting the
argument that bifurcation of undersecured home mortgages is permitted under
§ 1322(b)(2), some courts have specifically raised the question whether Con-
gress intended residential mortgages to be protected from modification regardless
of the secured status of the claims as defined under § 506(a).O6 The court in
In re Demoff'07 noted that "[tihe legislative history to § 506(a) states that
'throughout the bill, references to secured claims are only as to the claim deter-
mined by the [subsection], and not to the full amount of the creditor's claim'"los
Another court described the legislative history and intent of § 506 as provid-
ing priority status throughout the Code only for secured creditors that are "in
fact" secured and preventing creditors that are undersecured from unjustly enjoy-
ing priority status over other unsecured creditors.o 9 Accordingly, based on the
general purpose of § 506(a) to define what constitutes a secured claim and
an unsecured claim, and the lack of any clear mandate from Congress in its
enactment of § 1322(b)(2) to override the general definition and distinctions
made between secured and unsecured claims throughout the Code, these deci-
o3 Wilson, 895 F.2d at 128; In reDemoff, 109 B.R. 902,911 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1984) (quoting In ricHild,
bran, 54 B.R. 585, 586 (Bankr. D. Or. 1985)); Cameron Brown Co. v. Bruce (In re Bruce), 40 B.R. 884,
886-87 (Bankr. WD. Va. 1984) (quoting In re Neal, 10 B.R. at 536); Neal, 10 B.R. at 536-37.
1o4See In re Shaffer, 84 B.R. 63,65 (Bankr. WD. Va. 1988); In re Morphis, 30 B.R. 589,592-93 (Bankr.
N. Ala. 1983); In re Simpkins, 16 B.R. 956, 972 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982).
05See supra note 97.
106This point was expressed by the court in Demoff:
After a careful review and analysis of the express language of§ 506(a), § 506(d),
and § 1322(b)(2), the legislative history thereto, and the above reported cases deciding
the issue, this Court concludes, as a matter of law, that a chapter 13 debtor may value
a claim secured only by the debtor's principal residence pursuant to § 506(a), and
to the extent that the amount of the allowed claim exceeds the value of the credi-
tor's interest in such property, i.e. is not an allowed secured claim, the creditor shall
have an unsecured claim. The lien that secures a claim that is not an allowed secured
claim is void pursuant to § 506(d), and the unsecured portion of the claim can be
modified notwithstanding § 1322(b)(2).
109 B.R. at 919. Also see Wilson, 895 E2d at 128; In re Harris, 94 B.R. 832, 836 (D.N.J. 1989); In re Sim,
mons, 78 B.R. 300, 301-03 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1987); Bruce, 40 B.R. at 887-88.
1-7109 B. R. 902 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989).
108ld. at 919 (quoting S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1978)).
'
09Bruce, 40 B.R. at 887.
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sions conclude that the unsecured portions of residential mortgages are not
entitled to enjoy the anti-modification protection afforded secured mortgage
claims.P10
3. Statutory Construction
One of the principles of statutory construction used by the courts in inter-
preting §§ 1322(b)(2) and 506, and the interplay between the provisions, is
to read the statutes consistently and in a complementary manner, if possible."I
In applying this principle of statutory construction, some courts focus on
whether the statutes "conflict" with one another and are incapable of being
read together.P2 In all of these cases the courts have uniformly concluded that
the provisions are not in conflict.1 3 In Hougland v. Lomas & Nettleton Com-
pany (In re Hougland)"4 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals discussed this
principle of construction:
It has.., been suggested that sections 506(a) and
1322(b)(2) are in conflict. As our discussion shows, they are
not. They are in harmony when read in the context of the
whole statute. That is the way they must be read.
It is true that if our construction led to an absurdity, we
would be bound to eschew it and look for other guidance. No
such absurdity appears here. The truly secured portion of the
residential real estate lender's claim does have special protec-
tion. Only the unsecured portion does not. That does not con-
flict with any of the purposes of the statute, nor does it conflict
with the intent of Congress. We are comforted in this deci-
sion by the fact that a leading treatise on bankruptcy law agrees
with this construction of the statute." 5
Another example of a case considering the interplay between §§ 1322(b)(2)
and 506 by applying principals of statutory construction is found in Brouse v.
CBS Mortgage Corp. (In re Brouse)." 6 The court in this case concluded that
there was no reason to bar § 506 from being applicable to § 1322(b)(2), and
"°See supra note 106.
"'Hougland v. Lomas & Nettleton Co. (In re Hougland), 886 F.2d 1182, 1184 (9th Cir. 1989); Brouse
v. CSB Mortgage Corp. (In re Brouse), 110 B.R. 539, 543 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990); In re Demoff, 109 B.R.
902, 920 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989); In re Ross, 107 B.R. 759, 761 (Bankr. WD. Okla. 1989); In re Frost, 96
B.R. 804, 807 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989); In re Hill, 96 B.R. 809, 813-14 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989) (quoting
In re Frost, 96 B.R. at 806-07); Caster v. United States (In re Caster), 77 B.R. 8, 13 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987);
In re Neal, 10 B.R. 535, 539-40 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981).
"2See cases cited in note 111, supra.
'See cases cited in note 111, supra.
14886 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1989).
'"Id. at 1184 (citations omitted).
116110 B.R. 539 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990).
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found no inconsistencies between the provisions." 7 It stated that § 1322(b)(2)
includes a prohibition against the modification of the secured portion of a cred-
itor's claim against the debtor's primary residence as defined by § 506(a), and
that the debtor can only modify the unsecured portion of the claim, which is
not protected against modification by § 1322(b)(2), as allowed under § 506(d)
through lien avoidance.P8
Allowing a debtor to use Section 506(d) to avoid the lien
on the unsecured portion of the debtor's principal residence
does not negate the Section 1322(b)(2) prohibition of modifying
the security interest in real property that is the debtor's prin-
cipal residence. Section 1322(b)(2) will continue to provide pro-
tection to the holder of a security interest in a debtor's principal
residence that is not provided to a holder of a security interest
that is not the debtor's principal residence.P9
The court in In re Frost"20 held that, because the claim protected from modifi-
cation under § 1322(b)(2) was a secured claim, § 506(a) had to be applicable
to determine whether there was a secured claim to be entitled to the protec-
tion afforded under § 1322(b)(2)."2 Moreover, it noted that, if the term "secured
claim" in § 1322(b)(2) was intended to mean something other than the general
definition found in § 506(a), Congress would have so indicated.22
Some courts have held that, because the provisions can be read together
consistently, there is no need to apply the principle of statutory construction
requiring that a specific statute, like § 1322(b)(2), be the controlling provision,
and thus preclude the definition of "secured claim" as defined under the general
1171d. at 543.
191d. at 543-44.
12096 B.R. 804 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989).
121The court stated:
The Court has reviewed other court decisions on this issue and agrees with those
opinions which hold that § 506(a) and § 1322(b)(2) must be interpreted in a com-
plementary manner. A claim must be allowable as a secured claim pursuant to § 506(a)
before it may be protected under § 1322(b)(2) as a "claim secured only by a security
interest in real property that is the debtors! principal residence:. . . The secured claim
protected by § 1322(b)(2) is determined only after application of the principles of
§ 506(a). If the meaning of"secured claims" in the first phrase of§ 1322(b)(2) were
different from the meaning of"claim secured" in the second portion of§ 1322(b)(2),
surely Congress would have indicated such a distinction by the insertion of neces-
sary qualifiers. The Court believes the two phrases express identical legal concepts:
a claim allowed as secured after application of the principles of § 506(a).
96 B.R. at 807.
1221d
.
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provision of § 506.23 Contrary to the contentions of the creditor in Wilson v. Com,
monwealth Mortgage Corporation,24 that the specific provision of § 1322(b)(2)
superseded the general provision of§ 506(a), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
held:
[C]onstruing section 1322(b)(2) to allow bifurcation of secured
and unsecured portions of a claim and to allow modification
of the unsecured portion makes it consistent with section 506,
a section of general applicability. Nor does reading section
1322(b)(2) in this manner leave the section without a raison
d'etre. Section 1322(b)(2) continues to prevent modification of
the rights of holders of a secured claim secured only by a real
estate interest in the debtor's home, rights that in the absence
of the exclusionary language of the section could be modified
under Chapter 13.125
4. Bankruptcy Policy and Congressional Intent
When interpreting the statutory relationship between §§ 1322(b)(2) and
506, courts have also considered whether the right to bifurcate undersecured
claims, or to avoid liens against residential property of a debtor, support the
"fresh start" policy that underlies the bankruptcy system and is carried forth
under chapter 13.326 Some courts describe the congressional intent behind chap
ter 13 as designed to "make available the Chapter 13 remedy to a wide range
of financially distressed debtors, including those who may have one or more
123Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d 123, 128 (3d Cir. 1990); Loader v. Chariton
Credit Union (In re Loader), 128 B.R. 13, 16 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991); In re Demoff, 109 B.R. 902, 920 (Bankr.
N.D. Ind. 1989). Courts finding that the specific provisions of § 1322(b)(2) supersede the general provi,
sions of § 506 are discussed at notes 153-61 infra and accompanying text.
124895 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1990).
115d. at 128.
1261n re Honett, 116 B.R. 495,497 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1990) ("The court is of the opinion that 11 U.S.C.
§ 506(a) is a universal concept to be employed throughout all the bankruptcy chapters in addition to being
in keeping with the spirit of the Chapter 13 'fresh start:"); In re Gadson, 114 B.R. 453, 456 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 1990) ("In a broader view of the problem, consideration ought to be given to the 'fresh start' principal
[sic] of the Bankruptcy Code and in particular the Congressional intent to encourage debtors to file for
adjustment of debts under chapter 13 rather than liquidation under chapter 7.7); Brouse v. CSB Mortgage
Corp. (In re Brouse), 110 B.R. 539 at 542 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990) ("Simply stated, this Court is persuaded
that the majority view allowing a debtor to employ Section 506(d) is correct in legal terms, sound in terms
of statutory construction, and unavoidable under the fresh start concept of the Bankruptcy Code-"); In re
Harris, 94 B.R. 832, 836 (D.NJ. 1989) ('The court's holding attempts to reconcile the different policies
behind the bankruptcy code. First, the decision will 'promote [the] fresh start purpose' of bankruptcy law
'by not strapping the debtor with preexisting unsecured debt'") (citation omitted); In re Simmons, 78 B.R.
300, 304 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1987) ("This Court reaches its decision being ever mindful that the Bankruptcy
Code is to be equitably interpreted to accomplish its purposes; and that one of the primary purposes of
bankruptcy law is to give the honest debtor 'a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort,
unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt: My ruling certainly promotes this
fresh start purpose by not strapping the debtor with preexisting unsecured debt.) (citation omitted).
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mortgages on their homes."127 These courts have considered the suggestion,
that an undersecured creditor's claim against a debtor's home could not be modi-
fied to the extent of the unsecured portion of the claim, to violate the "fresh
start" policy of bankruptcy and the intent of Congress to protect creditor claims
that are "fully secured" from modification.1
28
It has been noted that chapter 13 makes bankruptcy relief more appealing
to the debtor with liens against his or her property by allowing the debtor
to repay his or her debts without being burdened by "liens that lack equity
security in the property"129 If the bifurcation of an undersecured mortgage held
against a debtor's residence were not permitted, junior creditors would be
able to obtain mortgages in a debtor's residence that may be overburdened by
liens, and be able to assert protection against modification of the unsecured
portion of the claim. 30 The court in In re Neal rejected this interpretation of
chapter 13:
It is not consistent with the statutory scheme of Chapter 13,
and the Bankruptcy Code's bifurcated treatment of a [sic]
secured and unsecured claims, for instance, to assume that a.
junior mortgagee on real property which is already overbur-
dened by senior mortgages, could insist on being treated as
a creditor with a secured claim and insist on full payment of
its claim based upon the pre-petition contractual arrangement
with the debtor. It would appear that in that instance the
Court would be constrained to find, pursuant to § 506(a) of
the Bankruptcy Code, that the junior mortgagee was in fact
the holder of an unsecured claim and thus unable to invoke
the protection of § 1322(b)(2) and prevent confirmation of a
Chapter 13 plan.' 3'
In general, courts considering bankruptcy policy and congressional intent
when interpreting the interrelationship between §§ 1322(b)(2) and 506 have
stated that § 1322(b)(2) was intended to protect only the secured portion of
a mortgage, as defined under § 506(a), from modification. 32 Accordingly, the
creditor's rights are not impermissibly modified under § 1322(b)(2), if the claim
is bifurcated into a secured and unsecured claim pursuant to § 506.
'
27 Inre Neal, 10 B.R. 535,539 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981). Also see Gadson, 114 B.R. at 456; In re Demoff,
109 B.R. 902, 920 (Bankr. N.D. Id. 1989) (quoting In re Neal, 10 B.R. at 539); Caster v. United States
(In re Caster), 77 B.R. 8, 13 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (quoting In re Neal, 10 B.R. at 539).
UsNeal, 10 B.R. at 540; In re Harris, 94 B.R. 832, 836-37 (D.NJ. 1989).
12 9Harris, 94 B.R. at 836. Also see In re Shaffer, 84 B.R. 63, 66 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1988); Simmons, 78
B.R. at 304.
'30See cases cited in note 129 supra.
13110 B.R. at 537.
'32See supra note 126.
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B. CASES PROHIBITING THE BIFURCATION OF UNDERSECURED CLAIMS
UNDER § 1322(b)(2)
Many of the courts prohibiting the bifurcation of undersecured claims under
§ 1322(b)(2) use the same approaches to statutory interpretation that are
employed by the courts expressing the view that bifurcation of such claims is
permissible under § 1322(b)(2). As in the cases summarized above, these courts
also look to the "plain meaning" of the language of §§ 1322(b)(2) and 506, the
legislative history of section chapter 13, principles of statutory construction,
and underlying bankruptcy policy and congressional intent to support their
interpretation of these provisions under the Code.
1. Plain Language.
Several of the courts prohibiting the bifurcation of undersecured residen-
tial mortgages under § 1322(b)(2) have also focused on the "plain language"
of § 1322(b)(2) and § 506 in interpreting the meaning and interplay between
these provisions. 33 Some courts have found the language of § 1322(b)(2) to
be "straight-forward" and unambiguous in protecting the entire claim secured
by a debtor's home, without regard to whether the claim was a secured claim
as defined under § 506.j34 These courts essentially have concluded that the
language in § 1322(b)(2) prohibiting the modification of "a claim secured only
by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence"
is not a protection limited to "secured claims" as defined by § 506(a). 35
In reaching this conclusion, the courts have rejected the argument that the
extent of the protection against modification provided under § 1322(b)(2) is
based on whether the claim is a "secured claim" or an "unsecured claim.''I36 It
is argued that the language most significant in determining the extent of pro-
tection under § 1322(b)(2) are the "rights of holders of secured claims ... secured
only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal resi-
dence"' 137 As the court in In re Hussman 38 explained:
The debtors, as well as other courts, have confused the
issue of the type of claim holder with the analysis of a deter-
1
3 ln re Hussman, 113 B.R. 490,492 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991); Boullion v. Sapp (In re Boullion), 123 B.R.
549, 551 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990); In re Christiansen, 121 B.R. 63, 64 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990); In re Chavez,
117 B.R. 733, 735 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990); In re Sauber, 115 B.R. 197, 199 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990); In re
Schum, 112 B.R. 159, 161-62 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990); In re Russell, 93 B.R. 703, 705-06 (D.N.D. 1988);
In re Catlin, 81 B.F. 522, 524 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987).
134Christiansen, 121 B.R. at 64; Sauber, 115 B.R. at 199; Catlin, 81 B.R. at 527. The court in Schum,
112 B.R. at 159, took the position that, while the language of the statute is "key" to the task of construing
a statute, it expressed the opinion that § 1322(b)(2) was nevertheless ambiguous because of Congress' fail-
ure to define the term "modify' Id. at 160-61.
'
3
sHussman, 133 B.R. at 492; Christiansen, 121 B.R. at 64; Sauber, 115 B.R. at 199; Russell, 93 B.R. at 705.
116Sce cases cited in note 135 supra.
13711 U.S.C.A. § 1322(b)(2) (West Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).
138133 B.R. 490 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991).
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mination of a secured claim under § 506(a). Courts which have
reached the opposite result look first to the result of applying
§ 506 to the claim and then look to § 1322 to allow the
debtors to modify the unsecured portion of the claim. Deter-
mination of the secured claim under § 506(a) is irrelevant to
§ 1322(b)(2). Section 1322(b)(2) deals with modifying the
rights of holders of certain claims. Section 1322(b)(2) protects
creditors whose claims are secured by a security interest in
real property that is the debtor's principal residence. This lan-
guage does not limit the protection to a secured claim secured
only by a security interest in such real property. Debtors need
only look to the holder of the claim to determine if they may
modify that claim. Only the rights of holders of claims secured
by an interest other than the debtor's principal residence and
holders of unsecured claims may be modified. The holders of
claims secured by an interest in real property which is the debt-
ors' principal residence can be modified only to the extent that
defaults may be cured within a reasonable time. 39
The court further noted that § 1322(b)(5) was the only provision specifically
defining the extent of permitted modifications under § 1322(b)(2), by allow-
ing a debtor to cure a prepetition default on the secured claim under the chap-
ter 13 plan.4o
2. Legislative History
In considering the legislative history, some courts have looked to the his-
tory of the wage earner's relief provided under the Bankruptcy Act, as well
as the legislative history of § 1322(b)(2).' 41 In In re Kaczmarczyk142 the court
noted that relief for the debtor under Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act was
insignificant in cases where the debtor's prepetition creditors held secured claims
against a debtor's real or personal property.' 43 This was largely due to the fact
that the claims secured by real property were not handled under the chapter
XIII bankruptcy plan, and a claim secured by a debtor's personal property could
only be included under the plan if the creditor consented. 44
13id. at 492 (emphasis deleted). Other cases expressing similar views include Christiansen, 121 B.R.
at 64; Sauber, 115 B.R. at 199; and Russell, 93 B.R. at 705.
14
°Hussman, 133 B.R. at 492; Chrisfiansen, 121 B.R. at 64; Chavez, 117 B.R. at 735; Sauber, 115 BR.
at 199.
141Hussman, 133 B. R. at 492; Boullion v. Sapp (In re Bouillon), 123 B.R. 549, 551 (Bankr. WD. Tex.
1990); In re Chavez, 117 B.R. 733, 736 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990); In re Kaczmarczyk, 107 B.R. 200, 202-03
(Bankr. D. Neb. 1989); In re Hynson, 66 B.R. 246, 252 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1986).
142107 B.R. 200 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989).
1431d. at 202-03.
144Id.
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Under the Bankruptcy Act, the predecessor of the cur-
rent Bankruptcy Code, a Chapter XIII plan could not deal with
claims secured by real property. Although the Chapter XIII
plan could deal with secured claims, the statutory definition
of the term "claim" expressly excluded "claims secured by
estates in real property or chattels real" Furthermore, Chap-
ter XIII did not provide a debtor with a viable opportunity
to "deal with" claims secured by personal property unless the
secured creditor consented. Under the Bankruptcy Act, a
Chapter XIII plan could not be confirmed unless every secured
creditor "dealt with" by the plan consented to confirmation.
Chapter XIII was thus of limited utility respecting secured
claims. 45
The court noted that the Bankruptcy Code was enacted to eliminate some
of the restrictions against modification that existed under the Bankruptcy
Act, and to make the Code available and useful to more individuals by per-
mitting the modification of both secured claims and unsecured claims under
§ 1322(b)(2). 46
Some courts found that Congress did not intend to change the protection
against modification of claims secured by a debtor's principal residence in its
enactment of§ 1322(b)(2). 47 The courts in In re Hussman148 and Boullion v. Sapp
(In re Boullion)149 adopted the analysis of the legislative history of § 1322(b)(2)
provided by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Grubbs v. Houston First Ameri-
can Savings Association'50 :
The final amendments to H.R. 8200 and S.B. 2266 (the lat-
ter being the Senate's amended version of the House bill) were
accomplished by a series of agreed-upon floor amendments in
both houses, by which differences between the two versions
were reconciled and compromised. With regard to § 1322(b)(2),
the Senate receded from its position that no "modification" was
to be permitted of any mortgage secured by real estate; it
instead agreed to a provision that modification was to be barred
only as to a claim "secured only by a security interest in real
143Id (citations omitted).
146 1d. at 203.
1471n re Hussman, 133 B.R. 490,492 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991); Boullion v. Sapp (In re Boullion), 123 B.R.
549, 550 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990); In re Chavez, 117 B.R. 733, 736 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990); In re Kaczmar-
czyk, 107 B.R. 200, 203 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989); In re Hynson, 66 B.R. 246, 252 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1986).
148133 B.R. 490 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991).
149123 B.R. 549 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990).
150730 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1984).
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property that is the debtor's principal residence' This limited
bar was apparently in response to perceptions, or to sugges-
tions advanced in the legislative hearings .. that, home-
mortgagor lenders, performing a valuable social service through
their loans, needed special protection against modification
thereof (i.e., reducing installment payment, secured valuations,
etc.) 15
As the court in In re Kaczmarczyk concluded, "[i]f Congress had intended to
change the manner in which a claim secured by a debtor's residence would be
treated under the Code it would have specifically limited § 1322(b)(2) to claims
secured pursuant to § 506."152
3. Statutory Construction
Each of the courts relying on principles of statutory construction applied
the general rule that provisions of specific application supersede provisions of
general applicability. 53 This rule was described and applied by the court in In
re Hynson: 54
In reconciling these two statutory sections, it must be
noted that 11 U.S.C. § 506 is a provision of general applica-
bility in cases under Chapters 7, 11 and 13 of the Bankruptcy
Code. See, 11 U.S.C. § 103(a). On the other hand, 11 U.S.C.
§ 1322 applies only in cases under Chapter 13. See, 11 U.S.C.
§ 103(h). This court accepts the tenet of statutory construc-
tion which provides that regardless of the inclusiveness of the
general language of a statute, it does not apply or prevail over
matters specifically dealt with in another part of the same
enactment. Accordingly, while courts have recognized the
general applicability of 11 U.S.C. § 506 in bankruptcy cases,
its applicability has been limited where more specific statu-
tory provisions apply, or where such application is inconsis-
tent with the policy of the Bankruptcy Code. 5-5
1SIBoullion, 123 B.R. at 551 (quoting Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Say. Ass'n., 730 F.2d 236 at 246)
(emphasis deleted).
1S210 7 B.R. at 203.
1-13n re Lee, 137 B.R. 285, 287 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1991); Boullion, 123 B.R. at 550; In re Chavez, 117
B.R. 733,735-37 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990); In re Sauber, 115 B.R. 197, 199 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990); Roberts
v. Skiba (In re Roberts), 99 B.R. 653, 655 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989); In re Russell, 93 B.R. 703, 705 (D.N.D.
1988); In re Catlin, 81 B.R. 522, 524 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1989); In re Hemsing, 75 B.R. 689, 691-92 (Bankr.
D. Mont. 1987) (quoting In re Hynson, 66 B.R. 246, 249 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986)); In re Hynson, 66 B.R. 246,
249 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1986).
154Hynson, 66 B.R. at 246.
IssId. at 249-50 (citation omitted).
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Several of these courts generally conclude that, because §§ 1322(b)(2) and
506 conflict, the more specific language of § 1322(b)(2) must prevail over the
general language of § 506.56 As the court in In re Catlin15 7 stated:
[Sections 1322(b)(2) and (b)(5)] constitute an impairment stat-
ute. As the statute relates to claims secured only by a debtor's
principal residence, it is a limitation on a debtor's ability to
impair, or leave impaired, the rights of holders of those claims.
The rights of such holders, and in effect the claims themselves,
can be impaired by a plan only to the limited extent of a pro-
vision affording a debtor the bankruptcy remedy of a reasonable
period to repay prepetition defaults.
11 U.S.C. §§ 502(b) and 506(a) and (b) are more general
claim impairment statutes. To the extent that § 1322(b)(2) and
(5) are inconsistent with and contradictory to these Chapter
5 statutes, the § 1322(b)(2) and (5) provisions supersede them.
Accordingly, in a Chapter 13 case, the allowed amount of
a claim secured only by a security interest in the principal resi-
dence of a debtor is, at filing, the balance owing on the debt
without regard to the value of the collateral-§ 506(a) notwith-
standing. Application of § 506(a), where the value of the col-
lateral is less than the debt, would modify the rights of the
holder of a claim secured only by a security interest in the prin-
cipal residence of a debtor beyond the permissible impairment
provided in § 1322(b)(2) and (b)(5)." 8
In its application of these principles of statutory construction, the court in In
re Sauber'59 expressed criticism of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Hougland v.
Lomas & Nettleton Co. (In re Hougland)160 and its failure to appreciate these
concepts:
The Ninth Circuit, in Hougland, takes an overly techno-
cratic approach in both analyzing the language of§ 1322(b)(2)
and (b)(5), and in relating § 506(a) to it. Although ostensibly
undertaken in search of the plain meaning of these statutes,
that meaning, and the proper setting of the statutes in the con-
text of the overall scheme of the Code, is as clearly missed as
the proverbial forest might be missed in examining the trees.
l56Chavez, 117 B.R. at 735-37; Russell, 93 B.R. at 705; Catlin, 81 B.R. at 524; Hemsing, 75 B.R. at
691-92; Hynson, 66 B.R. at 249.
15781 B.R. 522 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987).
1S8Id. at 524.
119115 B.R. 197 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990).
160886 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1989).
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As the Hougland court noted, we are not concerned with the
significance of misplaced or omitted commas here, as was the
Supreme Court in United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises.
But what the Hougland court did not seem to appreciate,
is that we are dealing with general and specific concepts that
are intended to apply to, and govern, the rights of debtors and
their creditors in different situations, and with different appli-
cations, depending upon particular Code purposes to be
served. The application of general concepts is not universal
in the scheme of the Code, but is subject to specific limitation,
and even total disregard, in some instances. 6'
4. Bankruptcy Policy and Congressional Intent
When considering the congressional intent behind chapter 13 and
§ 1322(b)(2), none of the decisions reviewed, prohibiting the bifurcation and
avoidance of undersecured claims under § 1322(b)(2), discusses the impact of
this position on the "fresh start" principles of the Code. The extent of discus-
sions concerning congressional intent or policy underlying § 1322(b)(2) is limited
to general statements that the provision was intended to protect the rights
of home mortgagees by preserving the "integrity of the mortgage contract' within
the limited exceptions of § 1322(b)(5), and permitting the cure of defaults
on such loans 62 Accordingly, the focus of the protection provided under
§ 1322(b)(2) was on the creditor's "claim', or right to payment of the holder
of the contract, and not the status of the claim as defined under § 506(a)' 63
In a frequently quoted statement, the court in In re Hynson164 made the fol-
lowing observation:
To apply the cramdown provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 506 to cred-
itors whose claims are secured solely by the debtor's principal
residence, would in large part vitiate the protections of 11
U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2). It would also be at odds with the clear
intent of Congress to protect a lender's security when a lender
is secured only by a security in a Chapter 13 debtor's home.
... The concept that only a "secured claim" and not an
"unsecured claim" of a mortgagee is protected within the ambit
of 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2), carries the syntax of the Bankruptcy
Code to an absurd conclusion which is at odds with the general
161115 B.R. at 199 (citation omitted).
1621n re Sauber, 115 B.R. 197, 199 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990); In re Schum, 112 B.R. 159, 161-62 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 1990); In re Russell, 93 B.R. 703, 706 (D.N.D. 1988); In re Hemsing, 75 B.R. 689, 692 (Bankr.
D. Mont. 1987); In re Hynson, 66 B.R. 246, 252 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1986).
1638ec cases cited in note 162 supra.
16466 B.R. 246 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1986).
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principles of statutory construction and with the clear intent
of 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) 65
V. BIFURCATION AND LIEN STRIPPING UNDER § 1322(b)(2):
POSTDEWSNUP
The Supreme Court's decision in the case of Dewsnup v. Timm'" caused
the bankruptcy bar and courts to reconsider whether the bifurcation ofunderse-
cured claims, and the avoidance of liens secured only by a debtor's primary resi-
dence is permissible under § 1322(b)(2) of the Code. Although Dewsnup v. Timm
did not involve a chapter 13 case, it did require the Court to determine whether
§ 506(d) could be used by a debtor in a chapter 7 case to "strip down" a lien
held by a creditor to the fair market value of the security, where the creditor's
claim was undersecured at the time of the filing of the petition. This case was
brought before the Supreme Court on appeal from the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals, and was granted certiorari because it represented a split from the Third
Circuit's opinion in Gaglia v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association.j67
The debtors in Dewsnup sought to avoid part of an undersecured credi-
tor's lien against their real property by having the claim classified into secured
and unsecured portions, pursuant to § 506(a), and then avoiding the unsecured
portion of the claim under § 506(d). This requested relief was denied by the
bankruptcy court, which held that, since the property had been abandoned
by the trustee and was no longer "property in which the estate has an interest,"
it was not subject to the classification of § 506(a) and similarly "not covered
by § 506(d)" 68 This decision was affirmed by the district court on appeal with-
out an opinion, and by the Tenth Circuit in agreement with the bankruptcy
court's finding that the provisions of§ 506 could not be applied where the prop-
erty in question had been abandoned. 69
On appeal the debtor argued that § 506(a) and (d) are "complementary and
to be read together,' to permit the bifurcation of claims allowed under § 502
into allowed secured and allowed unsecured claims, as well as to permit the
avoidance of any lien to the extent that the claim is unsecured. 70 The creditor
1651d. at 252-53.
166112 S. Ct. 773 (1992).
167889 F.2d 1304 (3d Cir. 1989).
168112 S. Ct. at 776.
1691d.
170d. at 777. Arguing on behalf of the debtor, the amicus curiae argued that this reading of the inter-
relationship of§ 506(a) and (d) should not be affected by the abandonment of the property by the trustee.
Amicus curiae claimed that any other reading of the provisions would be inconsistent with § 722, which
permits a debtor to redeem exempt property from the creditor based on the creditor's interest in the prop-




countered by arguing that § 506(d) is not to be "'rigidly tied' to section
506(a):"171 that is, subsection (a) is designed to provide for the classification
of claims by secured status for the purpose of ensuring "fairness to unsecured
claimants,"172 whereas subsection (d) is designed to preserve a creditor's lien
up until the time the creditor exercises his or her right to enforce the lien through
a foreclosure.173
Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun began his analysis of § 506
by noting that its relationship to other provisions of the Code raised "some
ambiguities' and thus, caused the Court to limit its interpretation of § 506
to the particular facts of the case before it. 74 Persuaded by the arguments of
the creditor and its supporters, the Court held that § 506(d) did not permit
a debtor to strip down the lien to the value of the collateral as suggested by
the debtor:
[Slection 506(d) does not allow petitioner to "strip down"
respondents' lien, because respondents' claim is secured by a
lien and has been fully allowed pursuant to § 502. Were we
writing on a clean slate, we might be inclined to agree with
petitioner that the words "allowed secured claim" must take
the same meaning in § 506(d) as in § 506(a). But given the
ambiguity in the text, we are not convinced that Congress
intended to depart from the pre-Code rule that liens pass
through bankruptcy unaffected.'"-
Moreover, Justice Blackmun wrote that, if a creditor's secured interest is
to be frozen at a judicially determined value, then the creditor would be deprived
of the benefits of any future appreciation in the property value that might exist
at the time of the actual foreclosure on the property.176 This, the Court added,
would result in a "windfall" to the debtor and deprive the creditor the bene-
fits of appreciation, a right the creditor bargained for under the mortgage agree-
171112 S. Ct. at 777.
1721d.
1731d. Arguing on behalf of the creditor, the United States filed an amicus curiae brief and interpreted
§ 506(a) as a provision simply providing a "term of art;' and argued that this term was not applicable to
subsection (d), which provides for the avoidance of liens against "claims that have not been allowed and
secured:' Id. at 776-77.
174Id. at 778. ("Hypothetical applications that come to mind and those advanced at oral argument illus-
trate the difficulty of interpreting the statute in a single opinion that would apply to all possible fact situa,
tions. We therefore focus upon the case before us and allow other facts to await their legal resolution on
another day.")
175Sd. (footnotes omitted).
1761d. ("The practical effect of petitioner's argument is to freeze the creditor's secured interest at the
judicially determined valuation. By this approach, the creditor would lose the benefit of any increase in
the value of the property by the time of the foreclosure sale. The increase would accrue to the benefit of
the debtor, a result some of the parties describe as a 'windfall'")
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ment. 77 The Court cited its past decisions, Farrey v. Sanderfoot'Ts and John-
son v. Home State Bank, 79 for the rule that "a lien on real property passes through
bankruptcy unaffected," and stated that no provision in pre-Code law "permitted
involuntary reduction of the amount of a creditor's lien for any reason other
than payment on the debt.'"180 It stated further that, "[wihen Congress amends
bankruptcy laws, it does not write 'on a clean slate:" and that the "Court has
been reluctant to accept arguments that would interpret the Code "to effect
a major change in pre-Code practice that is not the subject of at least some
discussion in the legislative history ' 18 where there is ambiguity in the language
of the relevant provisions. 8 2
After Dewsnup courts considering the permissibility of bifurcation and cram-
down of residential mortgages under § 1322(b)(2) were faced with the addi-
tional question of what impact Dewsnup would have on the question. In a few
instances case opinions reflected no consideration of Dewsnup;18s in other deci-
sions, Dewsnup was found to be so limited to chapter 7 liquidation proceed-
177Id.
.78111 S. Ct. 1825 (1991).
19111 S. Ct. 2150 (1991).
180112 S. Ct. at 779.
181Id.
182Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in which he stated that, when one reads § 506(d) "natu-
rally and in accordance with the other provisions of the statute, [subsection (d)] voids a lien to the extent
the claim it secures is not both an 'allowed claim' and a 'secured claim:" 112 S. Ct. at 780. He added that,
to read the provision otherwise, would be to replace what Congress said with something that the Court
"thinks Congress ought to have said" and ignores principles of statutory construction. Id. He stated that
the resolution of the case turned on the meaning of one phrase, "allowed secured claim." Id. Justice Scalia
believed that § 506(d) "unambiguously" provides for when a lien secures and does not secure a claim, and
to the extent it is void thereunder. Id. He stated that the meaning of the allowed secured claim was not
left to "speculation:' but was clearly provided for in § 506(a). Therefore, "allowed secured claim, as stated
in § 506(d), is in reference to allowed "secured claim" as defined in § 506(a). Id.
Moreover, Justice Scalia added that, when the Code uses the term "allowed claim", it refers to the "secured
party's entire allowed claim, i.e., to both the 'secured' and 'unsecured' portions under § 506(a) .... "Id.
However, he did not agree with the majority, that the term "allowed secured claim" in § 506(a) need not
be read as an indivisible term of art defined by reference to § 506(a)." Id. (quoting the majority at 112 S.
Ct. at 777). In support of this, he cited the rule of statutory construction that "identical words used in
different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning." Id. (citations omitted). He also criticized
the majority for offering no basis for overlooking the textual or structural basis of the plain meaning of
§ 506(d), and resting its decision on "policy intuitions of a legislative character, and upon the principle that
a text which is 'ambiguous'... cannot change pre.Code law without the imprimatur of'legislative history:"
Id. at 781.
'
5 3The courts in In re Torrez-Lopez, 138 B.R. 348 (D. P.R. 1992), and Lomas Mortgage USA v. Roberts,
137 B.R. 343 (D. Alaska 1992), only referred to and followed the decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in Hougland v. Lomas & Nettleton Co. (In re Hougland), 886 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1989), and
held that the bifurcation of undersecured claims that are secured by a debtor's residence into secured and
unsecured claims was permissible under § 1322(b)(2). Both courts agreed that only the secured portion
of the claim was protected against modification and not the unsecured portion. The court in Torrez-Lopez
stated that this interpretation of § 1322(b)(2) was correct and would prevent creditors from trying to secure
loans with mortgages against a debtor's home regardless of the equity in the property in order to get pro-
tection against modification under § 1322(b)(2).
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ings that it was not believed to be relevant to reorganizations under chapter
11 or 13.184 Some courts regarded Dewsnup as strengthening, or clarifying with
certainty, case precedents prohibiting the bifurcation and cramdown of residen-
tial mortgages under § 1322(b)(2). 85 Other courts took the view that Dews-
nup clearly prohibited lien stripping under § 1322(b)(2), but did not prohibit
the bifurcation of undersecured claims under § 1322(b)(2). 86
Several courts, including the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, have read
Dewsnup to be limited to chapter 7 liquidations, and not dispositive on the ques-
tion of the applicability of § 506 to provisions in the Codes reorganization chap,
ters. 87 In the case of Bellamy v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Co. (In re
Bellamy)'88 the Second Circuit held that § 1322(b)(2) only prohibits the modifi-
cation of a creditor's claim, secured by a mortgage against the debtor's prin-
cipal residence, to the extent that it is a secured claim, as the term is defined
under § 506(a) of the Code.8 9
The court in Bellamy rejected the creditor's argument that the Supreme
Court had precluded reading the term "secured claim" as used in § 1322(b)(2)
to have the same meaning as it does in § 506(a).P90 The court further noted
that the Supreme Court had been very clear that its decision in Dewsnup did
not attempt to determine the extent to which the definition of the term "secured
'18 Bellamy v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re Bellamy), 962 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1992); Sapoes
v. Provident Inst. of Say., 967 F.2d 918 (3d Cir. 1992); In re Weber, 140 B.R. 707 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992).
185Nobleman v. American Sav. Bank (In re Nobleman), 968 F.2d 483 (5th Ci. 1992), cert. granted, 113
S. Ct. 654 (1992); In re Strober, 136 B.R. 614 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Davidoff, 136 B.R_ 567 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1992). The court in In re Ireland, 137 B.R. 65 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992), also decided against bifurcation
and lien avoidance, but did not find Dewsnup to be especially helpful in its decision. The court in In re Sainz-
Dean, 139 B.R. 739 (Bankr. D. Col. 1992), followed the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Eastland Mort-
gage Co. v. Hart (In re Hart), 923 F.2d 1410 (10th Cir. 1991) (permitting bifurcation ofundersecured home
mortgage claims under § 1322(b)(2), but expressing reservations with its decision because of Dewsnup.)
'86Harris v. Barclay's American Mortgage Corp. (In re Harris), 1992 WL 33843 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992);
Thras v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp. (In re Taras), 136 B.R. 941 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992); In re Dyer,
142 B.R. 364 (Bankr. D. Ariz.).
587See supra note 186. The court in Inre Govan, 139 B.R. 1017 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1992), similarly found
Dewsnup to be limited in its interpretation of§ 506 to the facts of that case. The debtor in this case had
filed a chapter 7 petition prior to a chapter 13 petition. In the chapter 7 case the debtor received a personal
discharge of his prepetition liabilities, including the creditor's claim, and subsequently filed a chapter 13
petition to save the property from foreclosure by the creditor. The court cited the Supreme Court in John-
son v. Home State Bank, 111 S. Ct. 2150 (1991), for its position that a debtor receiving a chapter 7 dis-
charge may file a subsequent chapter 13 plan proposing the payment of the amount of the lien that secured
the creditor's prepetition claim and survived the debtor's chapter 7 discharge.
188962 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1992).
189Id. at 180 ('Although [the creditor] is correct in noting that § 506(a) does not itself affect a creditor's
right to payment, it does not follow that § 1322(b)(2) operates without reference to § 506(a).... But the
manner in which the right to payment must be satisfied is fixed by the Code, which accords different treat-
ment to claims depending on whether they are secured or unsecured. Hence, bifurcating [the creditor's]
claim into unsecured and secured portions does not, for purposes of § 1322(b)(2), modify its 'rights; but
rather simply determines how, under the Code, its right to payment must be satisfied.") (citations omitted).
90Id. at 182.
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claim" was applicable to other provisions of the Code.'91 It emphasized that
what the Supreme Court did was to determine that the term "secured claim"
as defined in § 506(a) was not the same term used in § 506(d). 92 The Court
of Appeals then noted that the way that the term "secured claim" is used in
§ 506(d) is different from the way it is used under § 1322(b)(2), which is more
similar to the way it is used in § 506(a). 193
The term "secured" indicates whether the claim is secured,
not (as in § 506(a)) the extent to which the claim is secured.
If "secured claim" in § 1322(b)(2) is read to mean only whether
the claim is secured, the drafter's choice of phraseology is dif-
ficult to comprehend and would render it in conflict with the
Code's overall scheme. There are several reasons for this.
First, § 1322(b)(2), unlike § 506(d), refers to unsecured
as well as secured claims. It seems that "unsecured claims" has
the same meaning in § 1322(b)(2) as it does in § 506(a); and,
by a parity of reasoning, that its counterpart-secured claims-
should also be understood as they are defined in § 506(a). Sec-
ond, and more importantly, § 506(d), unlike § 506(a), is con-
cerned with liens, § 1322(b)(2) - as does § 506(a) - addresses
claims....
Further, this reasoning is in contrast to that motivating
the Supreme Court in Dewsnup not to apply § 506(a)'s defini-
tion in § 506(d), which was § 506(d)'s failure to evince an une-
quivocal legislative purpose to alter pre-Code practice
respecting the voiding of liens. Under the Bankruptcy Act liens
on real property were unaffected by bankruptcy proceed-
ings .... Hence, [the Court] rejected, in the absence of any
clear legislative directive to do so, applying the definition of
"secured claim" in § 506(a) to § 506(d), because to do so would
"depart from the pre-Code rule that liens pass through
bankruptcy unaffected"
Dewsnup's analysis of § 506(d) is thus inapposite in inter-
preting § 1322(b)(2). Past bankruptcy practice precluded the
debtor from affecting the claims of creditors holding real prop-
erty as security. Yet, distinct from its treatment of liens, the
Code expressly contemplates that a Chapter 13 debtor's plan
of reorganization may today, contrary to pre-Code practice,
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As a result, applying § 1322(b)(2) in light of§ 506(a) does not
alter well-settled bankruptcy principles. To the contrary, it fur-
thers Congress' scheme under Chapter 13 by allowing the
adjustment of claims secured by real property.
Moreover, as a further distinction, a Chapter 7 debtor's
personal liability generally is extinguished upon liquidation,
while a Chapter 13 debtor does not obtain discharge from per-
sonal liability until payments under the plan of reorganization
are completed. This suggests that, as distinct from the more
limited concerns implicated when lien avoidance is sought in
Chapter 7, allowing Chapter 13 debtors to strip down an
undersecured residential mortgagees claim forwards the legis-
lative purpose of furthering reorganizations for individuals with
regular income to enable them to retain their homes. 94
Similarly, the court in In re Weber'95 held that bifurcation was a "basic prem-
ise of the Bankruptcy Code, "and that § 506(a) determines the extent to which
a creditor's claim is to be protected against modification under § 1322(b)(2).
The court felt that, if Congress had intended to prohibit the modification of
the rights of the holder of a claim secured only by a debtor's residence, regard-
less of the secured status of the claim, it would have specifically provided for
such in the statute. 96 Agreeing with Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Dews-
nup, it saw no reason to interpret the terms "secured claim" or "claim secured"
as used in § 1322(b)(2) differently from the manner used elsewhere in the
CodeP9
In re Davidoff'98 is one of the first post-Dewsnup cases to find Dewsnup
to "bolster" the interpretation of courts that find bifurcation and avoidance of
undersecured claims to be prohibited under § 1322(b)(2).99 In its reading of
§ 1322(b)(2) the court held that the relevant language of the provision is "to
modify the rights of holder of secured claims", and that the bifurcation of a cred-
itor's claim does not pay the creditor "pursuant to its note and mortgage
'94Id. at 183-84 (citations omitted).




198136 B.R. 567 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992).
1991d. at 569. See In re Strober, 136 B.R. 614 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992). The court in In re Ireland, 137
B.R. 65 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992), took the position that bifurcation and lien stripping of residential mort-
gages is not permmitted under § 1322(b)(2). Although the court discussed Dewsnup, it did not believe it
resolved the questions of lien stripping under chapter 13, and felt that it did not provide much guidance
toward resolution. In a similar vein, the court in In re Sainz-Dean, 139 B.R. 739 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992),
seemed to believe that the Tenth Circuit would probably reverse its position on bifurcation in Eastland Mort,
gage Co. v. Hart (In re Hart), 923 F.2d 1410 (10th Cir. 1991), after Dewsnup. However, because Hart had
not been reversed by Dewsnup it continued to follow Hart in allowing bifurcation of undersecured home
mortgage claims under § 1322(b)(2).
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and thus is a modification prohibited under § 1322(b)(2)" 200 On the significance
of Dewsnup to its finding, the court stated that the:
Supreme Court [had determined] that a lien could not be
avoided under Section 506(d) through the valuation mecha-
nism in Section 506(a) where such claim was allowed pursuant
to Section 502. In this case, the [creditor] has an allowed
secured claim and therefore the [creditor's] lien cannot be
avoided under 506(d). 201
The court felt that this was consistent with § 1322(b)(2), where the secured
creditor's interest is not modifiable if secured only by the principal residence
of the debtor. 20 2
The court in In re Strober203 also found Dewsnup to undermine support for
the position that bifurcation is permitted under § 1322(b)(2). 204 The court stated
that, although the Supreme Court did not address whether § 506(d) could be
used to strip down a claim under chapter 13, it believed that it was "almost
impossible to reconcile the decision's rationale with any different result in Chap-
ter 13."205 This court was in complete agreement with the Supreme Court that
stripping down of a claim would deprive the creditor of any right to increases
in value occurring before foreclosure, which is what the creditor has bargained
for.206 It also agreed that, because of the ambiguities in § 506, it would not
read the section to broaden the debtor's authority to avoid an allowed claim
to the extent that it is unsecured under § 506(a). 207 Moreover, the court felt
that there was even less reason to permit bifurcation and lien avoidance under
chapter 13, which has a prohibition against modification of claims secured by
a debtor's principal residence. 208 The court also found support for its position
against bifurcation and lien avoidance under § 1322(b)(2) in the plain language
of the provision, the legislative history of § 1322, and the statutory scheme
of the provision.209





203136 B.R. 614 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992).
204Id. at 618-19.




2091d. In its reading of§ 1322(b)(2), the court felt that the provision was clear in protecting claims only
secured by the lender's home mortgage. It felt that those who read the provision as limiting § 1322(b)(2)
to the secured portion of the claim confuse:
the term "secured claim" with the phrase "claim secured only" by a home mortgage
and disregard the difference in the function of the word "secured" in the two phrases.
In the phrase "secured claim" the word "secured" is an adjective modifying "claim,"
so that the entire phrase can legitimately be read as meaning a wholly secured claim.
(Vol. 67
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Most recently, in Nobleman v. American Savings Bank (In re Nobleman)210
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals joined the post-Dewsnup cases finding bifur-
cation to be a prohibited modification of § 1322(b)(2). It also split with the
In the latter phrase, "a claim secured only by, the phrase "secured only by" performs
an adverbial function describing a characteristic of the claim, i.e., that it is secured
only by a residential mortgage. That a claim is "secured only by" a residential mort-
gage does not mean that it is necessarily a "secured claim" Even if the mortgage exceeds
the value of the residence so that the claim is not a secured claim, in the sense of
wholly secured, it is still correctly described (if the creditor holds no other security)
as "secured only by" a residential mortgage.
136 B.R. at 619-20.
The court also found support in the legislative history, particularly the testimony of Edward J. Kulik
of the Real Estate Division of the Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. and Robert E. O'Malley of Coving-
ton & Burling. The court stated that § 1322(b)(2) was compromise legislation between the House and Sen-
ate, and was the result of testimony from the banking industry "deploring lien stripping." Id. at 620. It noted
that Kulik expressed specific concern that, if cramdowns were allowed in chapter 13 cases, it would make
lenders much more conservative in making home financing available. Id. at 621. In response to Senator DeCon-
cini's "skepticism" regarding the extent of a possible decreases in the availability of home mortgage financ-
ing that would result from the allowance ofcramdowns, O'Ivlalley stated that "savings and loans will continue
to make loans to individual homeowners, but they will tend to be, I believe, extraordinarily conservative
and more conservative than they are now in the flow of credit:' Id. (citing Hearings Before the Subcommittee
on Improvements of the Judicial Machinery of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
709, 715). The court also added that the substitution of the word "only" for "wholly" was made to make
it clear that the provision protected from modification a mortgage secured "only" by a debtor's principal
residence, whereas the term "wholly" emphasized whether the claim was secured to the extent of the value
of the residence. Id. at 622.
The court held that bifurcation or lien stripping of long term mortgages under § 1322(b)(2) was incon-
sistent with many other provisions under chapter 13. Id. at 622-23. The court noted, for example, that
under § 1322(b)(5) a debtor is required to cure a default within a reasonable time and to maintain mortgage
payments under the original contract. A bifurcation of a claim that "provide[s] for the cure of any default
only the extent of such default, together with the unpaid principal, does not exceed the present value of
the debtor's residence' and thus does not satisfy the requirement that the total amount in default be cured
where amounts of the default exceeding the present value of the property are not included under the plan.
Id. at 623.
The court also felt that the bifurcation of the long term mortgage conflicts with § 1322(b)(5), which
requires the plan to preserve the creditor's lien in the property and to pay under the plan the present value
of the property (the amount of the allowed secured portion of the claim). The court noted that, because
a plan under chapter 13 cannot exceed five years, the payments would have to be made within that time,
which the court stated most debtors would be unable to do given the large amount usually owed on
the long term home mortgage. Id. at 623. It held that courts permitting bifurcation have refused to
apply § 1325(a)(5) on the ground that it would "nullify the use of section 506(a) in Chapter 13 cases." Id.
at 623.
The court found the bifurcation of long term loans incompatible with the discharge provisions of 1328,
which prohibit the discharge of long term loans covered by § 1322(b)(5). It also found bifurcation inconsis-
tent with § 1307, permitting the conversion of a chapter 13 case to a chapter 7 case, and the fate of a bifur-
cated claim in a subsequent chapter 7 conversion in light of Dewsnup; as well as with the Codes avoidance
provision under § 522(f)(1), which limits a debtor's right to avoid a lien against a home to "judicial liens"
impairing a homestead exemption. Id. at 624. The court also noted that another inconsistency may be found
where bifurcation of a debtor's secured debt will increase the unsecured debt above the limit of unsecured
debts under chapter 13, and make the debtor ineligible for chapter 13 pursuant to § 109(e). Id. at 625.
210968 F.2d 483 (1992) (5th Cir. 1992).
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Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Ninth and Tenth Circuits. 211 In its
discussion of the impact of Dewsnup on the question of the permissibility of
bifurcation under § 1322(b)(2), the court briefly summarized the main find-
ings of the Supreme Court in Dewsnup and concluded that Dewsnup lent "sup-
port to this view that bifurcation is impermissible."'212 The bulk of its decision
was based on several methods of statutory interpretation used by many courts
addressing the interplay of § 506(a) and § 1322(b)(2). Accordingly, the court
in Nobleman believed that the words of the statute provide the best source
for determining the meaning of the provision; that the principles of statutory
construction require that, where a provision of general construction, such as
§ 506, conflicts with a provision of specific application like § 1322(b)(2), the
specific statute prevails; and that the legislative history of § 1322(b)(2) indi-
cates congressional intent to provide a special protection and preservation of
the rights of home mortgage lenders.213
The final group of post-Dewsnup cases is those interpreting Dewsnup as
not forbidding the bifurcation under § 1322(b)(2), but clearly prohibiting lien
avoidance thereunder.214 Harris v. Barclay's American Mortgage Corp. (In re
Harris)2' 5 and Taras v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp. (In re Taras)2' 6 are com-
panion cases that were decided by the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania. This court held that Dewsnup did not overrule the Third
Circuit in Wilson v. Commonwealth,2 7 and continued to follow the Third Circuit
decision finding bifurcation of undersecured claims, secured only by a debtor's
principal residence, to be permissible under § 1322(b)(2). The court did not
believe that the Supreme Court's decision in Dewsnup had overruled Wilson for
several reasons. First, it noted that the Court's decision was based on a chapter
7 liquidation, and was limited to the question of the permissibility of lien strip-
ping under § 506(d) in such cases. 218 It also pointed out that the Supreme Court
did not believe that Congress, in enacting § 506(d), had intended to overrule
the pre-Code position that liens survive bankruptcy in liquidation. 2' 9 Moreover,
211Lomas Mortgage USA v. Wiese, 980 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir. 1992); Bellamy v. Federal Home Loan Mort-
gage Corp. (In re Bellamy), 962 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1992); Eastland Mortgage Co. v. Hart (In re Hart), 923
E2d 1410 (10th Cir. 1991); Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1990); Hougland
v. Lomas & Nettleton Co. (In re Hougland), 886 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1989).
212Nobleman v. American Sav. Bank (In re Nobleman), 968 F.2d 483, 487 (5th Cir. 1992) cert. granted,
113 S. Ct. 654 (1992).
213Id. at 489.
214 Taras v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp. (In re Taras), 136 B.R. 941 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992); Harris
v. Barclay's American Mortgage Corp. (lnure Harris), 1991 WL 33843 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992); In re Dyer,
142 B.R. 364 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1992).
2-131992 WL 33843 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992).
216136 B.R. 941 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992).
217895 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1989).
218136 B.R. at 949 (quoting Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. at 777-78).
219136 B.R. at 949. Additionally, the court noted that the Supreme Court in Dewsnup was concerned
that by using § 506(a) and (d), "valuation of the secured property would be frozen pending a post-bankruptcy
foreclosure of the property, thereby according a debtor a 'windfall' in the event of appreciation of value"
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it noted that the Court found a distinction between the term "allowed secured
claim" as used in § 506(d) and the way it is used in § 506(a).220 From these
points, the court concluded that the Supreme Court recognized that bifurca
tion of a claim in a reorganization is distinct from lien stripping in a liquida-
tion, and that the Supreme Court had not determined that the bifurcation of
claims was prohibited in a reorganization. 221
Similarly, the court in In re Dyer222 did not believe that Dewsnup had over-
ruled the Ninth Circuit in Hougland v. Lomas & Nettleton Co. (In re Hougland),223
which permitted the bifurcation of an undersecured home mortgage under
§ 1322(b)(2). 224 In this case the court looked at the Supreme Court's decision
in Johnson v. Home State Bank,225 in addition to Dewsnup.
InJohnson the Supreme Court was required to determine whether a cred-
itor that held a claim, that had been discharged in a prior chapter 7 case and
was secured by the debtor's principal residence, would have a "claim" against
the debtor in a subsequent chapter 13 reorganization. The Supreme Court held
that, although the debtor had received a discharge of personal liability for the
debt to the creditor in the chapter 7 case, the creditor's lien against the real
property securing the claim survived the chapter 7 discharge under § 506(d),
and would be an enforceable "claim" against the property in the subsequent
chapter 13 case.226 The court in Dyer found Dewsnup to be an extension of
Johnson, by preserving the validity of the liens in a chapter 7 liquidation under
Id. (quoting Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. at 778). The court stated that these two points reflected con-
cerns not relevant to the use of § 506(a) in reorganization cases, because valuation in the reorganization
process is fixed at the time of confirmation; whereas in the chapter 7 case valuation is fixed at the time
of the filing of the petition. Moreover, the court noted that Congress was clear that § 506(a) was to be




222142 B.R. 364 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1992).
223886 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1989).
224The court in Dyer identified three approaches to analysis applied by the courts considering the interpre-
tation of§ 1322(b)(2) since Dewsnup: (1) cases permitting bifurcation but prohibiting lien avoidance if the
debtor does not propose to pay the entire claim in reorganization; (2) cases that prohibit bifurcation and
lien avoidance and cite Dewsnup as support for this interpretation; and (3) cases permitting bifurcation as
well as lien avoidance. In re Dyer, 142 B.R. 364, 369 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1992).
The court also noted that the Second Circuit in Bellamy "seems to state, in dicta, that the lien securing
an unsecured portion of a bifurcated claim may be avoided once a debtor has made all plan payments on
the bifurcated claim." Id. at 372-73. It noted further that Bellamy concluded that the creditor did not have
to be paid within five years as required under §§ 1322(c) and 1325(a)(5)(B). This the court believed was
inconsistent with the "in rem analysis in Johnson and Dewsnup" because "it implied] that the debtor may
reinstate the mortgage in a stripped down form, or a reduced principal balance equal to the value of the
residence at the time of the Section 506 or confirmation hearing, pay the arrearages pursuant to a plan of
reorganization, and make regular monthly payments until the reduced principal balance or secured claim
is paid in full' Id. at 373 (emphasis deleted).
225111 S. Ct. 2150 (1991).
226111 S. Ct. at 2153.
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§ 506(d).227 The court felt that these cases could be interpreted to give Hougland
"continued vitality",228 and noted that Hougland did not focus on § 506(d), as
the Supreme Court did in Dewsnup and Johnson, but only based its decision
on § 506(a). 229
Accordingly, the court in Dyer held that the debtor proposing a chapter
13 plan could bifurcate the undersecured claim under § 506(a), but could not
void the unsecured portion under § 506(d). 230 What this would mean for the
debtor is that he or she would make payments on the secured portion of the
claim during the plan, the unsecured portion would be paid like other unse-
cured claims, and the lien securing the claim would continue to secure the entire
bifurcated claim.231 At the end of the term of the plan, the debtor would receive
a discharge of personal liability under § 1328 of the Code; if any amount of
the creditor's claim remained unpaid, it would be secured by the lien against
the property under § 506(d). 32 The court held that this would correspond with
the ruling of Dewsnup and Johnson that the creditor should get the benefit of
any appreciation in the property before foreclosure.233
The court also described the benefit of permitting bifurcation of the underse-
cured claim under the chapter 13 plan, without the benefit of lien avoidance
for the unsecured portion of that claim:
The benefit to the Debtors is that during the term of the Chap-
ter 13 plan, the unsecured claim may be treated in a different
manner than the secured claim. The Debtors may propose a
minimal repayment to all unsecured creditors, including the
creditor with a bifurcated claim. Thus, the Debtors may pay
less to the creditor over the term of the Chapter 13 plan than
the Debtors would have paid if the creditor had a fully secured
claim, with interest accruing on the ful amount of the secured
claim. 234
VI. RECENT LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
This debate regarding the permissibility of bifurcating undersecured residen-
2271n re Dyer, 142 B.R. 364, 368 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1992).
228Id.
229See id.
230See id. at 369.:
231See id. at 373. In Dyer there were two liens against the debtor's principal residence. In each case,
the creditors holding these claims asserted protection against modification under § 1322(b)(2). Although
one of these claims was undersecured and the other unsecured due to a decline in the value of the property




233See id. at 372.
2314 d. (footnote omitted).
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tial mortgages under § 1322(b)(2) has not gone unnoticed by Congress. On
June 16, 1992 the Senate passed S. 1989 by a 97-0 vote. This bill proposed
to establish a national bankruptcy commission to study issues and problems
that have developed under the Bankruptcy Code; to amend the Code "in cer-
tain aspects of its application to cases involving commerce and credit and
individual debtors."235
Section 310 of Title III of the bill included a provision to address speci-
fically the permissibility of bifurcation of undersecured mortgages under
§ 1322(b)(2):
Section 1322(b)(2) of title 11, United States Code, is amended
by striking "claims;" and inserting "claims, but the plan may
not modify a claim pursuant to section 506 of a person hold-
ing a primary or a junior security interest in real property or
a manufactured home (as defined in section 603(6) of the
National Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety
Standards Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 5402 (6)) that is the debt-
or's principal residence, except that the plan may modify the
claim of a person holding such a junior security interest that
was undersecured at the time the interest attached to the
extent that the interest remains undersecured;".236
Accordingly, the new proposed amendment would have prohibited the cram-
down of all claims secured only by a debtor's primary residence regardless of
its secured status under § 506 of the Code. This prohibition would not only
cover first liens against the property but would also include any junior lien that
was fully secured at the time of origination of the mortgage.
Senator Helfin, who introduced the bill in the Senate in November, 1991,
expressed his views on the importance of this proposed amendment:
I believe that [§ 310] is one of the most important provi-
sions of this bill. This section would protect the mortgage-
backed securities market, and address the issue of cramdowns
in chapter 13 bankruptcies.... This section would completely
protect the entire claim in cases of first mortgages on residen-
tial real estate that is the debtor's primary residence. The sec-
tion would generally protect junior security interests except
235S. 1985, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
236138 Cong. Rec. S8249 (daily ed. June 16, 1992). 5.1985 was first introduced in the Senate in November,
1991. The original version of§ 310 of the bill was less prohibitive regarding the applicability of§ 506 under
§ 1322(b)(2): it limited the prohibition against the bifurcation ofundersecured claims to the claim of"a per,
son holding a primary security interest" in property serving as a debtor's principal residence, and did not
extend the prohibition to junior mortgages as provided under the final version of the bill. S.1985, 102d Cong.,
2d Sess. § 310 (1991).
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in circumstances where the security interest was undersecured
at the time of contracting, and only could be subject to a cram-
down to the extent that it remains undersecured at the time
of the bankruptcy. By inference, this section does acknowledge
a court's ability to bifurcate residential real estate under sec-
tion 1322 by the operations of section 506 of the Bankruptcy
Code. By protecting these important interests, the mortgage
marketplace is protected, stability of this marketplace enhanced,
and therefore, the consuming public who are currently faced
with uncertainty regarding residential real estate is served.237
On September 24, 1992 similar bankruptcy legislation was introduced in
the House Judiciary Committee by Congressman Jack Brooks.238 H.R. 6020
contained many of the same provisions found in S. 1985, including a proposal
to amend § 1322(b)(2). 239 Section 202 of H.R. 6020 specifically provided:
Section 1322(b)(2) of title 11, United States Code, is amended
(1) by striking "other than a claim secured only by a secu-
rity interest in real property that is the debtor's principal resi-
dence", and (2) by inserting before the semicolon at the end
the following:
", except that the rights of the holder of a claim secured only
by the most senior security interest in real property that is
the debtor's principal residence may not be modified to reduce
the secured claim to a value that is less than the value, as of
the date the security interest arose, of the creditor's interest
in the estate's interest in such property."240
Unlike the Senate version of§ 310, this provision limited the prohibition against
modification of claims secured only by a debtor's principal residence to senior
security interests as opposed to junior security interests that might also be out-
standing against the same property.241
237137 Cong. Rec. S17054 (daily ed. November 19, 1991).
238138 Cong. Rec. H9449 (daily ed. September 24, 1992).
239H.R. 6020, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 202 (1992).
2401d.
241The section-by-section analysis of the committee report accompanying the bill described the amended
as follows:
The Federal circuit courts of appeal are currently split as to whether individuals
filing for chapter 13 protection may bifurcate an undersecured home mortgage into
secured and unsecured portions. The issue has arisen because of the apparent con-
flict between Section 506 of the Bankruptcy Code (which allows bifurcation of allowed
claims into secured and unsecured claims and the avoidance of the lien on the unse-
cured), and Section 1322(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code (which prevents modifica-
tion of claims secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtors
principal residence). This section amends Section 1322(b)(2) to specify that senior
(Vol. 67
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This provision and others were proposed as amendments to S. 1985. On
October 7, 1992 the Senate adopted all of the amendments proposed under
H.R. 6020, and added some new provisions to the bill as well.242 Although
this legislation was supported in both houses of Congress from the beginning,
it failed to pass the House due to the controversial nature of some of the last-
minute amendments made by the Senate.
A. ThsTImoNY
In June, 1991 the Senate Committee on the Judiciary's Subcommittee on
Courts and Administrative Practice held hearings to consider the impact of
the cramdown of residential mortgages in chapter 13 cases. 243 Several represen-
tatives of the residential mortgage industry appeared before the subcommit-
tee to explain the effect these cramdowns had on the industry, and to appeal
to Congress to make it clear that cramdowns of residential mortgages are not
permitted under chapter 13 in any case, including instances where the mort-
gagee is undersecured. 244 Only one individual appeared before the committee
to speak in favor of the bifurcation of undersecured mortgage in chapter 13 cases.
On July 8, 1992 the House Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law
held special hearings on "Consumer Issues in Bankruptcy. 24- At these hear-
ings representatives from consumer financial institutions and consumer interest
groups offered testimony on the proposed consumer bankruptcy amendments,
including the proposed amendment to § 1322(b)(2). 246 The testimony of the
mortgage liens may not be bifurcated under Section 506 to the extent they were not
undersecured when they were originated.
H.R. REP. No. 996, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., at 21-22 (1992) (citations omitted).
242138 Cong. Rec. 517500 (daily ed. October 7, 1992).
2  
'The Impact of Court Decisions Which Have Allowed "Cramdowns" of Residential Mortgage Loans Under
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Administrative Practice of
the Senate Judiciary Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (hereinafter Cramdown Hearing).
244Representatives of the residential mortgage industry appearing before the subcommittee on June 6,
1991 included: Frank Keating, General Counsel, Department of Housing and Urban Development; Dean S.
Cooper, Associate General Counsel, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation; John P. Davey, Draper &
Kramer, Inc., Chicago, Illinois, on behalf of Mortgage Bankers Association of America; Larry Gilmore, Oak,
wood Acceptance Corporation, Greensboro, North Carolina, on behalf of the Manufactured Housing Institute
and the National Manufactured Housing Federation. Id. at 44-77. Alvin 0. Wiese, Jr. of Indian Wells, Cali-
fornia, appeared before the subcommittee on behalf of the National Consumer Bankruptcy Coalition on June
27, 1991. Proposed Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, Focusing on the Effects
of Bankruptcy on Individual Consumers: Hearings Before Subcomm. on Courts and Administrative Practice of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102 Cong., 1st Sess. 94-123 (1991) (hereinafter Consumer Bankruptcy Reforn).
24 5Consumer Issues In Bankruptcy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Economic and Commercial Law of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (hereinafter Consumer Bankruptcy Issues).
24 6The participants included: Barbara L. Clore, President, Associated Industries Credit Union, Deer
Park, Texas, representing the National Consumer Bankruptcy Coalition; Martin J. Kelly, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer, ITT Consumer Financial Corporation, Minneapolis, Minnesota; Willard Gourley,
Jr., Barclay's American Mortgage Corporation, Charlotte, North Carolina, representing the Mortgage Bankers
Association of America; HenryJ. Sommer, Supervising Attorney, Consumer Law Project, Community Legal
Services, Inc., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, representing the National Bankruptcy Conference; Gary Klein,
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several speakers appearing before these committees provide different perspec-
tives of the effect of cramdowns on creditors and debtors.
1. Hearings Before the Senate Subcommittee on Courts and Administration
During the hearings on the effect of cramdowns of residential mortgages
under § 1322(b)(2) of the Code before the Senate Subcommittee on Courts
and Administration, three witnesses appeared to testify in favor of a legisla-
tive amendment to the Code specifically prohibiting cramdowns of claims
secured by a lien against a debtor's principal residence: Dean Cooper, Associate
General Counsel of the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie
Mac"); Frank Keating, General Counsel of the Department of Housing and
Urban Development on behalf of the Government National Mortgage Associ
ation ("GNMA'); and Larry Gilmore of the Oakwood Acceptance Corpora-
tion on behalf of the Manufactured Housing Institute and the National
Manufactured Housing Federation. 247 Henry Sommer of the Community Legal
Services, Inc. testified against any prohibition of cramdowns of undersecured
claims in chapter 13 cases.248
Dean Cooper, speaking on behalf of the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Cor-
poration, expressed concerns about the adverse impact that the allowance of
cramdowns has on residential mortgages in chapter 13 cases. Cooper stated
that, "tals a purchaser of residential mortgages which guarantees the payment
of principal and interest to investors in [its) securities, Freddie Mac ultimately
absorbs the cost of cramdowns"249
Cooper stated that cramdowns result in a windfall for the bankrupt debtor
and a loss to the lender by allowing the debtor to keep a mortgaged home, "cram
down the debt to the depressed value of the property, and enjoy the benefit
of appreciation of value of the property when market conditions improve, while
having no obligation to pay the lender anything more than the reduced amount
of the debt' 250 It was his view that the courts permitting cramdowns of underse-
cured mortgages had misinterpreted the meaning of§ 1322(b)(2), and that cram-
Managing Attorney, New Hampshire Legal Assistance, Manchester, New Hampshire, representing the
National Consumer Law Center. Id.
247Alvin 0. Wiese, Jr. appeared before the subcommittee on June 27, 1991, to testify on behalf of the
National Consumer Bankruptcy Coalition ("NCBC"). Consumer Bankruptcy Reform, supra note 244 at 94-123.
Wiese expressed the view that the cramdown of residential mortgages was never intended to be allowed
under § 1322(b)(2) by Congress, and was definitely "not sound policy if the residential housing credit mar-
ket is to be preserved." Id. at 111. He also stated that he did not agree with the courts limiting the applica-
tion of the anti-modification provisions of § 1322(b)(2) to long-term residential mortgages and excepting
second mortgages or junior liens against a debtor's residence from the anti-modification protection, regard-
less of the secured status of the claim under § 506 of the Code or the length of the term of the junior claim.
Id. Accordingly, it was the recommendation of the NCBC that the Code be amended to prohibit any modifi-
cation of a claim secured only by a debtor's principal residence. Id.
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downs were not intended to be permitted under this provision as enacted by
Congress. Accordingly, it was his recommendation that Congress amend the
Code for "technical clarification of section 1322(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code
to reassert in the clearest statutory language that home mortgages may not
be crammed down in chapter 13 plans."251
Frank Keating, General Counsel for the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, presented the views of the Government National Mortgage
Association on court decisions permitting the cramdown of undersecured
residential mortgages in chapter 13 cases.25 2 As a guarantor of the payment
of principal and interest on privately-issued investment securities secured by
FHAinsured or VA-guaranteed mortgages, it too has a direct interest in the
determination of whether cramdowns of residential mortgages are to be per-
mitted under chapter 13.253
Keating explained that, when a bankrupt debtor is allowed to cramdown
an undersecured residential mortgage under a chapter 13 plan, the lender will
most likely receive very little payment under the "newly unsecured portion
of the mortgage" 254 Unfortunately for the lender/GNMA issuer, it remains
obligated "to make pass-throughs of all required principal and interest to the
investors in the mortgage-backed security."255 Accordingly, GNMA expressed
concern that the lending community would become soured by the cramdown
and perhaps reduce home lending activities to individuals in communities where
2S1Jd
,
=Keating was accompanied by Robert P Kalish, Executive Vice President of GNMA, and Guy S. Wilson,
GNMAs Vice President for MortgageBacked Securities. Cramdown Hearing, supra note 243, at 2-27.
253In his testimony Keating described the role of GNMA in the mortgage finance industry as follows:
GNMA guarantees the timely payment of principal and interest on privately-issued
investment securities that are backed by pools of FHA-insured or VA-guaranteed mort-
gages. GNM/s principal mission is to support the Governmentes housing objectives
by establishing secondary markets to channel funds from the securities market into
the mortgage market, thereby increasing the supply of credit available for housing.
Under the GNMA mortgage-backed securities program, issuers are responsible
for collecting principal and interest payments from borrowers and passing these pay-
ments PLUS ANY SHORTFALL (e.g. amounts not received from mortgagors) through
to the GNMA investors. Payments to the investors are based on the initial principal
balance and the stated coupon rate of the securities, which is further correlated to
the interest rate on the underlying mortgages. Unlike the respective mortgage-backed
securities programs of the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) and the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC), GNMA does not hold the
mortgages in trust; rather, GNMA serves only as a guarantor of the timely payment
of principal and interest by the issuers. The issuers, in the GNMA program, hold
the underlying mortgage documents and are compensated for searching the loans to
a greater extent than are FNMA or FHLMC program participants because they are
required to pass-through full monthly payments to investors regardless of whether
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the property values are at "potential cramdown risk."2,56 Like Cooper and other
commentators on this question, Keating asserted that the result of the cram-
down is an unfair windfall to the debtor because the creditor's secured claim
will not be increased in the event of a future appreciation in the value of the
collateral.257
He also stated that the effects of the cramdowns have already material-
ized for the GNMA issuers:
Both FHA and VA have adopted the position that claims
would be paid only on the secured indebtedness as it may have
been reduced by the court. GNMA has determined, based
on the contractual obligations with its approved issuers, that
the issuers are responsible for the shortfall in principal due the
GNMA investors caused by a cramdown. Furthermore,
GNMA has determined that the payment differential- or to
put it another way, the unsecured portion of the mortgage
debt-is due upon bankruptcy discharge. This means that not
only would the GNMA issuer lose the payments from the
mortgagor representing the unsecured portion of the debt, but
upon discharge of the Chapter 13, the issuer must pass-through
this now unsecured portion of the debt to the investors in the
mortgage-back security. The issuer is required to advance these
funds from its capital to keep the mortgage-backed security
in balance with the underlying secured loan backing that
security. 258
Keating added that this result could be very adverse for the issuer if it is required
to make large "cash outlays" to meet its liability for the unsecured portions of
the mortgages.25 9 In the event that the issuer is unable to meet these payments
and defaults on its obligations to GNMA, GNMA, as guarantor, would have
to bear the burden of the shortfalls to the investors.2 60 Keating noted that not
only does the effect of the cramdown present a serious risk of loss to the issuer
but there is also the possibility of great loss for GNMA.
While the current risk is mimimal since the slide of prop-
erty values in various parts of the cournty has significantly
abated, the opportunity for swift losses in an unexpectedly
severe economic downturn in one or more regions of the coun-








1993) UNDERSECURED RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGES
numerous GNMA issuers. In turn, each defaulted GNMA
issuer would constitute a drain on the resources of GNMA.261
The ultimate result of this situation is that it may make lenders leery about
making home mortgage financing available to individuals in areas where the
risk of cramdowns in the event of a borrower's bankruptcy is high.262 Keating
recommended that Congress amend the Code "to clarify the intent of the
bankruptcy law" so that cramdowns of undersecured residential mortgages are
not permitted under § 1322(b)(2).263
Larry Gilmore appeared on behalf of the Manufactured Housing Institute
and the National Manufactured Housing Federation, and represented various
interests in the manufactured housing industry including lenders. 264 In his tes-
timony he stated that his organizations were "generally opposed to chapter 13
bankruptcy cramdowns" and felt that such practices by the courts were con-
trary to the intent and purpose of Congress when it enacted the Code in 1978.
He urged Congress to make it clear that such modification of home mortgages
is impermissible under chapter 13.26-5
With respect to the manufactured housing industry, Gilmore noted a unique
problem faced by its member lenders: although manufactured homes serve as
primary residences like site-constructed housing, and loans obtained to pur-
chase these homes are financed with a first lien, they are nevertheless treated
as consumer loans and not real estate mortgage loans.266 Most often the bor-




2641n his testimony Gilmore defined manufactured housing and described the nature of the business:
Manufactured homes are built entirely in a factory. Today there are several forms
of factory built homes, including modular, panelized, and manufactured homes. My
remarks concern themselves with the form of factory-built housing known as manufac
tured homes, formerly known as mobile homes.
Manufactured homes are delivered from the factory in one or more sections. The
sections are completely assembled at the factory and require only minimal labor to
make them ready for occupancy once delivered to a home site.
Manufactured homes are built to federal standards prescribed by Congress in
1974 and implemented by the Department of Housing and Urban Development in
1976. Since developing the standards, HUD has maintained its surveillance of the
manufactured housing industry, primarily through its agent the National Conference
of States on Building Codes and Standards.
In the decade of the 1980's, manufactured home builders produced 2.5 million
homes, accounting for 14.2 percent of the 17.4 million privately-owned housing con-
struction started during the decade. This included manufactured homes. Manufac-
tured homes provide permanent shelter to over 12 million Americans, most of who
are families of modest means.
Cramdoum Hearing, supra note 243 at 67.
26S1d. at 66.
266jd.
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be located, or has financed the purchase of the land on which the home is to
be located separately.267 Accordingly, the manufactured housing industry was
greatly affected by the allowance of cramdowns of loans secured by such mobile
homes and viewed this as a serious threat to future funding for such housing.26s
Gilmore further explained that the likelihood of the collateral being appraised
lower than the loan balance is greater for manufactured homes than for perma-
nent housing due to the nature of the property and loan. 269 In the foreclosure of
a permanent home, the lender can foreclose on the real property. In the case of
manufactured housing often the lender can only foreclose on the mobile home,
which requires that it be moved from the site and a dealer be hired to sell it for the
lender, or it is sold to a dealer at a wholesale value versus its retail market value.
Thus it is the wholesale value that is used in appraising the property in
a chapter 13 cramdown.2 70 Gilmore argued that this was not fair because the
chapter 13 bankrupt is not losing the home but is keeping it and receives a wind-
fall through the bifurcation of the claim against the home. The lender's secured
claim is reduced to the wholesale value and not the retail value that it would
be worth to a purchaser. Gilmore saw this as an "unfair result for the lender"
and no practical relief for the bankrupt's cash flow problems because the monthly
payments of the secured claim are not reduced through the cramdown. He said
that what is happening through the cramdown is "the borrower is enriched
at the expense of the lender. 271
2671d.
268Gilmore stated:
It is our opinion that allowing portions of loans to be "crammed down" in a Chapter
13 bankruptcy proceeding could lead to serious disruption in the supply of funds for
home financing. This is true for all kinds of home financing, whether the homes are
treated as real estate or as personal property. In fact, because manufactured homes
treated as personal property represent an important source of unsubsidized afforda-
ble housing in the country, it is very important that the flow of credit to that por-
tion of the housing industry not be disrupted.
We urge Congress to clarify that it never intended for loans secured by first liens
on an owner-occupied home that is the borrower's principal residence to be subject
to modification in a bankruptcy proceeding; and to make clear that this applies equally
to real estate mortgages and loans on manufactured homes, whether those homes





'Gilmore gave an example of how the cramdown affected his organization in a bankruptcy decision
from the Bankruptcy Court in the Western Division of Texas:
To give you an example of a recent cramdown that we experienced at Oakwood
Acceptance, the [courti ordered the amount of our claim be reduced from $25,200,
which was the customer's balance, to $9,000 resulting in an unsecured claim due Oak-
wood of some $16,000. The home in question was a multisection home of some 1,120
sq. ft. and similar homes were selling in that market for $25,000 to $30,000.
Id. at 68.
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The only testimony before the subcommittee recommending the applica-
tion of § 506 in determining the extent of the anti-modification protection
allowed under § 1322(b)(2) was provided by Henry Sommer, staff attorney with
Community Legal Services, Inc. of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, which repre-
sents low income families and individuals seeking to save their homes from mort,
gage foreclosures. Sommer testified that the ability to use § 506 to cram down
mortgages in chapter 13 plans is critical to these debtors' ability to rehabili-
tate under the Code and achieve the "fresh start intended by Congress for
bankruptcy debtors."272 Moreover, Sommer stated that the distinction between
secured and unsecured claims under § 506(a) 1s essential to "insure fairness
in the distributions to creditors,' 273 and § 506(a) of the Code essentially "dupli-
cates the result [in bankruptcy] that would occur if the property were
liquidated' 274
Sommer identified several consequences that would probably result from
a decision by Congress to restrict the applicability of § 506 determinations of
secured status under § 1322(b)(2). He stated that the ability of the debtor to
strip down an undersecured residential mortgage in a chapter 13 plan is essential
to preventing creditors from avoiding the effects of a possible bankruptcy dis-
charge by taking a mortgage lien to secure all loans with the debtor.275 He
pointed out that creditors are able to, and often do, require that a debtor secure
a debt with his or her property even in cases where the property is so encum-
bered with liens that there is no equity in the property at the time of the loan
to actually provide security.276 For example, if a chapter 7 debtor is not able
to cram down the undersecured or unsecured mortgagee's claim, and is required
to treat the unsecured or undersecured claim as a fully secured claim, the debt-
or's property would remain liable for the full value of the debt after discharge,
even though it is not a secured claim entitled to such protection under the
Code.277 This would frustrate the fresh start the debtor originally sought in
272Cramdown Hearing, supra note 243 at 35. In explaining the purpose of § 506, Sommer noted that
in a chapter 7 liquidation the creditor holding a secured claim, as defined under § 506(a), is generally
entitled to a priority claim in the proceeds resulting from the liquidation of the property superior to the
claims of unsecured creditors; in the event the debtor elects to retain the encumbered property, by seeking
relief under the reorganization and rehabilitation provisions of chapters 11, 12 or 13, the secured creditor
is entitled to receive the value of the secured claim plus interest. He noted that, where the creditor's claim
exceeds the value of the collateral, resulting in the creditor's claim being either "partially secured, or even
totally unsecured" § 506(a) "assures that creditors receive special treatment as secured creditors only
to the extent they really have collateral securing their claims.' That part of the claim that is unsecured,
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turning to bankruptcy for relief.278
Sommer stated that the same result would occur under chapter 13 if§ 506
is not applicable to § 1322(b)(2). That is:
tilf the debtor cannot strip down the mortgage lien, he or she
may be required to pay the entire secured claim, plus interest
on that claim, in order to obtain plan confirmation under the
Code section 1325(a)(5). In effect, the debtor is required to
pay more to save his or her home than anyone else would have
to pay to buy it, because the debtor would have to pay the
total amount of the mortgages on the home even if they far
exceeded the value of the property.279
Sommer expressed concern that, if residential mortgages protected under
1322(b)(2) cannot be crammed down, in spite of the fact that they are partially
secured or unsecured, creditors desiring to avoid the effects of a discharge will
simply require that all loans be secured by a debtor's primary residence. The
sense in this eluded him:
[Ilt makes no sense to prevent a family that is struggling to
save its home from paying the secured creditors the full value
of that home in a chapter 13 case, with interest, when that
is all the creditors would receive if they foreclosed on the prop-
erty. What justification is there for forcing upon a family the
hardship of losing its home and moving when the family is will-
ing and able to pay the full value of the home to its creditors? 280
Sommer also stated that a prohibition against the use of § 506 under
§ 1322(b)(2) would frustrate bankruptcy policy to ensure equitable treatment
among creditors.28 1 He noted that, under chapter 13, secured creditors are enti-
tled to have their claims paid in full under the plan or to have prepetition arrear-
ages cured under the plan while the debtor continues mortgage payments
unchanged; unsecured creditors are entitled to receive whatever the debtor
has left after paying secured claims and his or her reasonable living expenses. 2s2
After the debtor completes performance under the plan, any amounts remaining
unpaid on unsecured claims are discharged.28 3 If the debtors are not able to
bifurcate residential mortgages held by creditors that are unsecured or under-
278Sommer made reference to § 522(f) avoidance provisions, which were designed to eliminate the result
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secured, the creditors' claims will be treated as secured under chapter 13, allow
ing the creditors to receive payments exceeding the actual value of their liens.
Sommer noted that the effect of this special treatment of this group of unse-
cured claims reduces the funds that might be available for distribution to other
creditors with unsecured claims.284
One other consequence of prohibiting the bifurcation of claims under
§ 1322(b)(2) is that the mortgage lender will be encouraged to engage in ques-
tionable transactions, because it will be able to collect on governmental or pri-
vate mortgage insurance. Sommer explained that the availability of governmental
guarantees through FHA and VA mortgage insurance has often led to "shaky
transactions:"28 5
There have been a number of scandals over the years where
realtors and appraisers have inflated the appraisals of homes
to be financed by FHA and VA mortgages, victimizing both
the family who then pays too much for the property and the
government if it later becomes the owner of the property after
a foreclosure, perhaps because the family could not afford the
payments on the inflated price. Because they know that any
defaulted mortgage will be paid in full by mortgage insurance,
lenders have had little incentive to be concerned about
whether the appraisals they receive exaggerate the real value
of the property and have happily passed all of the risk on to
the government.28 6
According to Sommer, lenders have become concerned that, if the prop-
erty is saved from foreclosure as a result of the debtor's chapter 13 filing and
the cramdown of the undersecured mortgage, they will not be able to foreclose
and thus not be able to collect on the FHA or VA insurance and will have to
bear the loss resulting from properties that have more than likely been overap-
284Sommer stated:
If a creditor holding a mortgage that is in reality fully or partially unsecured can pre-
vent the bifurcation of its claim into an allowed secured claim and allowed unsecured
claim, that creditor must be treated as the holder of a fully secured claim in the chapter
12 or 13 case. To the extent that creditor is paid more than the real value of its lien,
i.e. is paid in full on the portion of its claim that is in reality unsecured, it is taking
money from the pot of income available for distribution to all the unsecured credi-
tors. It thereby gains an advantage over the general unsecured creditors that is not
warranted by the value of its security and which it would not have in a liquidation
of the debtor's property. In many cases, a requirement that such undersecured cred-
itors be paid in full would also make it impossible to propose a feasible chapter 13
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praised. 287 Sommer viewed this risk of loss as having a sobering and therapeu-
tic effect on an abusive industry practice:
[If lenders realized that they were at least at some risk for these
losses, they might be more concerned about making sure they
obtained conservative appraisals, to the benefit of both
homebuyers and the government insurers. As a taxpayer, I cer-
tainly hope that the FHA program, which is losing billions of
dollars already, and other governmental guarantors will recog-
nize that it is not in their interest to allow lenders to avoid
the effects of a stripdown and thereby pass their losses on to
the government. 288
As noted by Sommer, the mortgage lending industry has suggested that
the risk it faces through the use of § 506 to strip down residential mortgages
could adversely affect the availability of financing for home mortgage loans.
He did not believe, however, that the availability of such financing would be
reduced if undersecured mortgages could be stripped down under § 506. His
opinion is based on the fact that residential mortgage cramdowns under
§ 1322(b)(2) have been occurring in some parts of the country since 1981, with-
out any evidence of a reduction of lending in these areas. 289 Another reason
supporting Sommer's doubts about a threatened decrease in mortgage lending
is that the number of debtors using § 506 to cram down purchase money residen-
tial mortgages is small. 290 He also stated that very few of the homeowners who




[S]ection 506 has been used to strip down liens in the Eastern District of Pennsyl-
vania, where I practice, since at least 1982, in the Western District of Pennsylvania
since at least 1981, and in other areas of the country as well for many years. To my
knowledge, nobody has yet suggested that the use of section 506 has had any impact
at all on mortgage lending in these areas. Mortgage credit in these areas has been




Homeowning debtors rarely file bankruptcy cases at all unless they are in danger of
losing their homes through foreclosure or suffering other severe financial distress. At
any given time well under one percent of all mortgage holders are in foreclosure
proceedings. Thus, the pool of bankruptcy debtors who would even have section 506
available to them is very small. There is no evidence that families without deep financial
problems file bankruptcy cases, which carry with them costs, risks and still some





Sommer believed that most cases involving strip downs of residential mort-
gages are the result of overappraisals, or involve cases where junior creditors
have taken mortgages against property of the debtor that has little or no equity:
No public policy is served by protecting the lenders in
either of these situations. Indeed, public policy should dis-
courage such practices, and the current provisions of
Bankruptcy Code section 506, as most courts have interpreted
it, do exactly that. The case has not been made that signifi-
cant numbers of homeowners in declining real estate markets
are utilizing lien stripping where they are not facing foreclosure,
much less that the availability of lien stripping has had any
measurable effect on the home mortgage market.
Even if the Congress were satisfied that a change were
warranted, any limitation on lien stripping should be carefully
circumscribed to address only the problems that might, if
shown, be described as legitimate-those arising with respect
to purchase money mortgages where the property value has
fallen. Congress should not create new ways for creditors to
circumvent the bankruptcy discharge nor should it encourage
creditors to be careless about obtaining accurate appraisals.
Any limitation on lien-stripping should be applicable only
to purchase-money mortgages and should only come into play
where the mortgage demonstrates that it is undersecured solely
because the value of the encumbered property has actually
declined since the mortgage was granted. To go beyond such
a change would only serve as an open invitation for the abuses
I have discussed.292
2. Hearings Before the House Subcommittee on Economic and
Commercial Law
The individuals that testified before the House Judiciary's Subcommittee
29'Sommer stated:
Of those homeowners who do file bankruptcy cases, only a very small number are
in the position of having mortgages, especially purchase money mortgages, exceed-
ing the value of their properties. Remember that most people make down payments
on their home purchases of 5% to 20%. Even in areas where property values have
declined, except for the small percentage of people who bought at the absolute peak
of the market (or whose properties were overappraised) and who made little or no
down payment, there are likely to be few whose purchase money mortgages exceed
the value of their home.
2921d. at 43-44.
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on Economic and Commercial Law on the question of cramdowns of residen-
tial mortgages under chapter 13 included Barbara Clore, speaking for the
National Consumer Bankruptcy Coalition; Martin J. Kelly of ITT Consumer
Financial Corporation; and Willard Gourley, Jr., representing the Mortgage
Bankers Association of America. Uniformly, these individuals expressed sup-
port for the proposed amendment to § 1322(b)(2) prohibiting the cramdown
of undersecured residential mortgages. Speakers testifying in support of the
debtor's right to cram down such mortgages included Gary Klein of the National
Consumer Law Center of Boston, Massachusetts and Henry Sommer of Com-
munity Legal Services, Inc. of Philadelphia. The legislation that was the sub-
ject of the hearings included consumer amendments proposed under both S.
1985 and H.R. 5321, both of which included amendments to § 1322(b)(2).
Clore stated that the amendment was "critical to assuring the free flow
of credit to housing finance."293 She also felt that the amendment would resolve
the conflicts existing in between the courts on the "use of section 506", as well
as "codif[yl a resolution to the problems raised by the Supreme Court's recent
Dewsnup decision."294 She also stated that limiting the protection against modifi-
cation of junior mortgages to those actually secured at the time the loan origi-
nated would curb potential abuse by lenders to offer home equity loans "based
on inflated home values" where in actuality there is little or no equity in the
property for security.295
Willard Gourley, Jr., speaking on behalf of the Mortgage Bankers Associ-
ation of America, felt that the proposed amendment to § 1322(b)(2) would
reflect exactly what Congress intended for the treatment of home mortgages
in its enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978.296 Gourley found support
for this position in the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.
In particular, he cited the testimony of Edward J. Kulik before the Senate Sub-
committee on Improvements in the Judicial Machinery in November of 1977,
in which he objected to the original House version of § 1322 that proposed
to allow debtors in chapter 13 to modify rights of holders of secured and unse-
293Consumer Bankruptcy Issues, supra note 245 (statement of Barbara Clore at 12).
29 4
1d.
2951d. This sentiment was echoed by Martin Kelly. He also expressed the view that cramdowns resulted
in an "injustice" to creditors by allowing debtors to "file bankruptcy during a downturn in the real estate
market, avoid the unsecured portion of the mortgage (due to loss of market value) and then ride the appreciation
back up when the real estate market rebounds.' Id. (statement of Martin Kelly at 9).
296Willard Gourley, Jr. stated:
Such a language clarification does not require a change in the balance of public poli-
cies intended by Congress in 1978; it does not require a review of the scope and avail-
ability of Chapter 13 for an individual who finds himself in an otherwise unmanageable
debt situation; and it does not require any alterations whatsoever in any other chapters
of the Code. It requires only a reassertion by Congress that mortgages that support
homeownership may not be modified in Chapter 13 plans.
Id. (statement of Willard Gourley, Jr. at 3).
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cured claims without restriction. In his testimony Kulik had warned the Sen-
ate that, if debtors were allowed to modify claims secured by home mortgages,
it would threaten the future availability of home mortgage financing. Gourley
quoted Kulik's recommendation to the Senate that "[slerious consideration
should be given to modifying [the legislation] so that at the least ... a mort-
gage on real property other than an investment property may not be modified: 297
Gourley believed that § 1322(b)(2) was enacted to provide protection against
modification of home mortgages as suggested by Kulik to continue a long recog-
nized effort by Congress to preserve the availability of home mortgage
financing.298
In his comment on the decisions by the Courts of Appeals that have per-
mitted bifurcation and modification of undersecured home mortgages, Gourley
found that such a position undercuts the interests of unsecured creditors under
the chapter 13 plan:
Curiously, while the Courts have held that the ultimate obli-
gation of the debtor to repay the mortgage may be reduced
in Chapter 13 cramdowns, they say that the monthly payment
called for in the mortgage must be preserved. Unless the home
mortgage were to be paid off in the three to five years allowed
by the Code for the life of Chapter 13 plans, the cramdown
approved by the Courts would seem to have no possible
positive effect on the ability of the debtor to pay unsecured
creditors during the plan period.299
Gourley listed specific adverse results that may occur if cramdowns are
permitted. The first is the impact that it would have on lenders participating
in the mortgage-backed securities market, an important secondary market for
home mortgages. He noted that, if mortgage lenders are to be motivated to issue
such securities, they must have some assurance that the mortgages securing
the securities are going to yield a "predictable flow of principal and interest "300
297Id. at 5.
298Willard Gourley, Jr. stated:
Of considerable importance in understanding the legislative history of the treatment
of home mortgages in Chapter 13, is the recognition that the enactment of Section
1322(b)(2) did not occur in a vacuum. In a series of Acts over almost six decades,
Congress has developed programs, institutions, favorable tax treatment, and a broad
legislative intent to encourage homeownership and efficient financing for homeowner-
ship for Americans of modest means.... A reading of the legislative history of Sec.
tion 1322(b)(2) that argues that Congress recognized that home mortgages needed
protection, but then limited that protection without being explicit in doing so, is con-
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The ability of a debtor to reduce the amount of the liability on the mortgage
to the market value of the collateral would "introduce an element of uncertainty
in the mortgage credit markets that would adversely affect the efficiency of
the market."30'
Gary Klein, who spoke on behalf of the National Consumer Law Center
and the Massachusetts Bankruptcy Shelter Preservation Clinic, expressed the
general view that H.R. 5321 was a "creditors' wish list" representing changes
proposed by consumer credit lenders that tipped the scales of balance and equity
of the Code in favor of creditors at the expense of debtors. °2 He also commented
on § (2)(g) of H.R. 5321, which proposed to prohibit the cramdown of underse-
cured residential mortgages. 303 He stated that this provision would severely
restrict the ability of a consumer to save a home by failing to "limit a creditor's
secured claim to the value of its collateral "3o4 He noted, as did Sommer, that
limiting the value of a creditor's secured claim to the value of the collateral is
exactly what the creditor would get upon foreclosure and sale of the property.305
Section 2(g) of H.R. 5321 extended the protection against modification to junior
creditors with liens against a debtor's home. Klein objected to such protection,
on the grounds that a junior creditor assumes a greater risk that the value of
the junior lien is likely to depreciate and accounts for this risk in charging higher
interest rates, and thus does not warrant the protection proposed under
§ (2)(g).306
Much of Sommer's testimony echoed the views he expressed a year earlier
when he appeared before the Senate Judiciary's Subcommittee on Courts and
Administration for the same purpose. With respect to the legislative proposals
prohibiting the cramdown of undersecured residential mortgages under chap-
ter 13, he reiterated the position that the support for this legislation was found
in the mortgage banking industry on the supposition that the allowance of cram-
downs would "dry up mortgage credit."3 07 Sommer once again argued that there
was little evidence that cramdowns had "any discernible effect on the mort-
gage market" and that, if such evidence had existed, the mortgage banking indus-
try would have marshalled it forth, which it had not succeeded in doing at that
time.308
He also reaffirmed the view that the stripdown of such mortgages was crit-
ical to the relief of families trying to save homes from foreclosure that were over-
encumbered by junior mortgages against property with little or no equity. The
3011d.
3021d. (statement of Gary Klien at 1).
30 3H.R. 5321, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(g) (1992).
'O4Consumer Bankruptcy Issues, supra note 245 (statement of Gary Klein at 9).
305Id.
3061d.
3°7Id. (statement of Henry Sommer at 3).
308Id.
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allowance of the cramdown did not adversely affect a secured creditor because
it would receive an amount equal to the amount it would obtain in a foreclosure
sale.309 He noted that to require the debtor to pay the full value of the out-
standing unsecured or undersecured claim of a junior mortgagor would require
the debtor to use monies to pay those unsecured claims that would have been
paid to other unsecured claimants.310 He also warned that the advocacy against
cramdowns was motivated by the fear of loss of FHA and VA insurance by
mortgage lenders against depreciated property that a chapter 13 would be able
to save from foreclosure through the remedy of cramdown. 31
VII. RESOLVING THE QUESTION OF BIFURCATION
UNDER § 1322(b)(2)
A. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS
While the number of decisions rendered addressing this question are
divided, the approaches to interpreting § 1322(b)(2) and its relationship to the
bifurcation provision of § 506(a) have been similar and consistent. Courts per-
mitting bifurcation under § 1322(b)(2), as well as those courts prohibiting bifur
cation thereunder, have decided the question in most cases by (1) interpreting
the "plain language" of§ 1322(b)(2); (2) analyzing the legislative history of the
provision; (3) applying special rules of statutory construction; and (4) analyz-
ing the congressional intent behind the provision and the basic principles of
bankruptcy law. In some cases the courts have used all of these approaches
to statutory interpretation to resolve the question, and in other cases the courts
have limited their interpretive efforts to one or more ofthese methods ofinterpre-
tation. For the most part, most of these cases both offer useful perspectives
on the interpretive evolution of this issue, and present useful analysis and argu-
ments in making a distinction between the conflicting views and choosing the
view that gives the best interpretation of § 1322(b)(2).
When comparing the analysis of statutory construction made by the courts
in considering the question of the permissibility of bifurcation under § 1322(b)(2),
courts taking the position that bifurcation is permissible are the most persua-
sive. 312 This is based on the fact that several of these courts have read the plain
language of § 1322(b)(2) in a direct and grammatically supportive fashion,
whereas the courts prohibiting bifurcation are compelled to render a forced read-
ing of § 1322(b)(2) to support their position.
Section 1322(b)(2) begins by identifying those claims that are modifiable






.312See supra notes 81-132 and accompanying text.
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the debtor may:
modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a
claim secured only by a security interest in real property that
is the debtor's principal residence, or of holders of unsecured
claims, or leave unaffected the rights of holders of any class
of claims. 313
As suggested by the court in In re Demoff,314 the affirmative phrase granting
the debtor the authority to modify the rights of holders of secured claims modi-
fies the phrase immediately following it, which prohibits the debtor from modify-
ing claims held by creditors that are secured by an interest only in the debtor's
principal residence.315 This court further held that, because the focus of the
first phrase is the secured claim, it follows that the prohibition against modifi-
cation is also limited to the "secured claims" against the debtor's home. 316 Fur-
thermore, the term "secured claim" is applied as defined by § 506(a) of the Code.
Moreover, these courts generally note that § 103(a) of the Code is quite unam-
biguous in stating that all provisions of chapter 5, which would include § 506,
are applicable to cases brought under chapter 13.317 Thus, this reading of the
text of§ 1322(b)(2) is grammatically correct and conforms with the statutory
scheme of the Code.
However, the courts holding that the language of § 1322(b)(2) prohibits
bifurcation have strained to conclude that the text of the provision prohibits
bifurcation. 31 These courts find that the language of§ 1322(b)(2) is unambig-
uous in protecting the entire claim secured by the debtor's home, regardless
of the secured status of the claim. 3' 9 They hold that the contractual "rights
of the holders" of claims secured only by the debtor's principal residence are
protected from modification under § 1322(b)(2). 320 Such a selective reading of
the text of§ 1322(b)(2) cannot constitute a complete reading of the plain lan-
guage of § 1322(b)(2), because it deemphasizes or ignores the terms "secured
claims" and "unsecured claims", which have special significance under the Code.
This view against the use of § 506(a) to bifurcate undersecured residen-
tial mortgages under § 1322(b)(2) is also contrary to a reading of the plain lan-
guage of § 103(a), which directs readers to use the administrative provisions
of chapter 5 throughout the Code. If Congress had meant for the prohibition
against the modification to protect the rights of all holders of claims secured
3.311 U.S.C.A. § 1322(b)(2) (West Supp. 1993).
314109 B.R. 902 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989).
31 5See supra text accompanying note 85.
316Id.
317See cases cited supra note 86.
3 5S8ee supra notes 133-40 and accompanying text.
319See cases cited supra notes 134-35.
320See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
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by a debtor's home, regardless of the secured status of the claim as a secured
claim or unsecured claim, it would not have been necessary to use the terms
"secured claims" and "unsecured claims" in § 1322(b)(2). Section 1322(b)(2)
could have been drafted to provide that the debtor may "modify the rights of
holders of all claims, with the exception of the rights of holders of claims secured
only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal
residence"
Courts prohibiting the bifurcation of residential mortgages also hold that the
only modification of the protected claim permitted under chapter 13 is the right
to cure prepetition mortgage installment delinquencies under § 1322(b)(5).32
Such an argument requires that one rewrite § 1322(b)(5) so that its purpose
is to define the term "modify" in § 1322(b)(2), which it clearly is not. The term
"modify" is not defined under the Code. The purpose of§ 1322(b)(5) is to pro,
vide the debtor with both secured and unsecured long-term debt a means to
include these debts under the plan, by allowing the debtor to cure any prepe-
tition delinquencies on such debts under the plan and to permit the debtor
to continue to pay postpetition installments during the plan and thereafter.322
It does not provide that the "cure" of the prepetition delinquencies on such
debts is the only modification of home mortgages permitted under § 1322(b)(2).
If one concludes that the language of § 1322(b)(2) is unambiguous, the
general rule of statutory construction requires that the inquiry of interpreta-
tion end with the plain language ofthe statute.3 23 However, many courts, includ-
ing those finding the language of § 1322(b)(2) to be unambiguous, have
considered the legislative history in their interpretation of the provision. Courts
finding the bifurcation of undersecured residential mortgages to be permissi-
ble under § 1322(b)(2) have found that the legislative history reflects an intent
to protect residential mortgages from modification.324 When tracing the evo-
32See cases cited supra note 140.
322See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
323Crawford states:
Since the legislature must express its intention by a written statute, that intention,
in any instance, must primarily be ascertained from the language used in the statute
itself, and not from conjectures aliunde. In other words, before the court can resort
to any other source for assistance, it must first seek to find the legislative intention
from the words, phrases and sentences which make up the statute subject to con-
struction. If the meaning of the language of the statute is plain, then according to
the rule announced in innumerable cases, there is really no need for construction as
the legislative intention is revealed by the apparent meaning, that is, the meaning
clearly expressed by the language of the statute. In this case, the statute is given a
literal interpretation. It is interpreted to mean exactly what it says. Only where the
statute is of doubtful meaning can the court endeavor to determine the legislative
intention from elements beyond the language of the statute.
EARL T. CRAwFoR , T CoNsTRucTioN OF STATuTEs § 164 (footnotes omitted) (1940).
124See supra notes 95-110 and accompanying text.
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lution of this provision, it has been clear to these courts that Congress wanted
to expand the availability of chapter 13 relief to debtors with secured claims
against real property by permitting these claims to be included under the plan
and to permit modification of these claims. 325 What is also clear from the legis-
lative history is that the home mortgage lending industry is to receive special
protection against modification under § 1322(b)(2). 326 However, several of these
courts were not willing to conclude from the legislative history that there was
any specific intent by Congress to override the application of § 506 to define
the extent of a secured claim, when applying the provisions of § 1322(b)(2)
to undersecured residential mortgages. 327
To the contrary, the courts prohibiting bifurcation have held that the legisla-
tive history is clear in prohibiting property valuation of residential mortgages to
determine the extent to which modification is prohibited under § 1322(b)(2). 328
Again, this reading of the legislative history requires some rewriting on the
part of these courts. What the legislative history indicates is that § 1322(b)(2)
was designed to expand chapter 13 relief for debtors to the extent of allowing
a debtor to modify both secured and unsecured claims against the debtor's real
and personal property, while providing protection against modification to claims
secured by an interest against a debtor's principal residence.329 There is no lan,
guage in the legislative history explicitly defining the term "modify" to include
determinations of property value or the secured status of claims as defined under
§ 506(a).
When comparing the courts' application of the rule of statutory construc-
tion that the provisions of a statute be read as consistently as possible, the
results of course are predictable. That is, courts permitting bifurcation have
determined that, because the secured portion of the claim is protected against
modification under § 1322(b)(2), it is not inconsistent to apply § 506(a) to deter-
mine to what extent the claim is a secured claim entitled to protection against
modification. 330 Courts prohibiting bifurcation have asserted that § 1322(b)(2)
is designed to protect the rights of holders of residential mortgages without
any distinction between the secured and the unsecured portion of the claim,
and have held that the application of § 506(a) would prevent this protection
and constitute a prohibited modification. 33' These courts have concluded that,
because of this conflict between § 1322(b)(2) and § 506(a), the more specific
provision of§ 1322(b)(2) must supersede § 506(a), a provision of general appli-
325See supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text.
3261d.
327See supra notes 101-02, 106-10 and accompanying text.
328See supra notes 141-52 and accompanying text.
M'
9See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
330See supra notes 111-25 and accompanying text.
33lSee supra notes 153-61 and accompanying text.
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cation.332
The application of this principle of statutory construction is clearly result-
oriented, and is used by the courts to support their interpretive conclusion.
Yet, it is the goal of the rule to encourage readings of provisions of a code or
statute with consistency; that is, one must assume that the drafters of the law
knew what they were doing and not intending to create any inconsistencies
between provisions. 333
The final method of interpretation employed in the analysis of § 1322(b)(2)
involves an analysis of how the two views support the basic principles of
bankruptcy law and congressional intent behind chapter 13. The courts find-
ing bifurcation under § 1322(b)(2) to be permissible assert that bifurcation is
in accord with the "fresh start" principle of bankruptcy relief, the need to pro-
vide equitable treatment to the debtor's creditors, and is supportive of the objec-
tives of Congress in its enactment of chapter 13.334 In the view of these courts,
bankruptcy relief is designed to provide a debtor with a fresh start. Bifurca-
tion of an undersecured claim supports the fresh start policy by limiting the
debtor's liability under the plan to repay the secured claim to the extent of mar-
ket value, and to restrict the creditor's right to payment to that which a secured
claim is entitled under the Code. 335 That is, the prohibition against bifurcation
of the undersecured claim would permit the unsecured portion of the underse-
cured claim to be fully paid, while other unsecured claims may not be entitled
to full payment under the plan. Moreover, bifurcation and the separate treat-
ment of secured claims and unsecured claims is a critical part of the statutory
332Id.
333According to Crawford, an authority on principles of statutory construction:
[T]he court should, when it seeks the legislative intent, construe all of the constitu-
ents parts of the statute together, and seek to ascertain the legislative intention from
the whole act, considering every provision thereof in the light of the general purpose
and object of the act itself, and endeavoring to make every part effective, harmoni-
ous, and sensible. This means, of course, that the court should attempt to avoid absurd
consequences in any part of the statute and refuse to regard any word, phrase, clause
or sentence superfluous, unless such a result is clearly unavoidable .... [T]he court
should seek to avoid any conflict in the provisions of the statute by endeavoring to
harmonize and reconcile every part so that each shall be effective. It is not easy to
draft a statute, or any other writing for that matter, which may not in some manner
contain conflicting provisions but what appears to the reader to be a conflict may
not have seemed so to the drafter. Undoubtedly, each provision was inserted for a
definite reason. Often by considering the enactment in its entirety, what appears
to be on its face a conflict may be cleared up and the provisions reconciled.
Consequently, that construction which will leave every word operative will be
favored over one which leaves some word or provision meaningless because of incon-
sistency.
CPAwoRD, supra note 323, §§ 165-166 (footnotes omitted).
3343ee supra notes 126-32 and accompanying text.
335See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
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scheme of the Code, and the inclusion of such relief under § 1322(b)(2) reflects
congressional intent to extend chapter 13 relief to debtors with encumbered
real property as well as encumbered personal property.336
The ability of the courts prohibiting bifurcation to forge a connection
between this interpretation of§ 1322(b)(2) and basic bankruptcy policy is lack-
ing. At the most, these courts simply refer to the intent of Congress to pro-
vide some protection to the home mortgage industry by preserving the terms
of the original contract. 337 This limited consideration of bankruptcy policy and
congressional intent is unsatisfactory: it makes the arguments in favor of pro-
hibiting bifurcation less supportive, and presents § 1322(b)(2) as a preferen-
tial provision favoring home mortgage lenders, devoid of any meaningful
balancing of interests between these protected creditors and the debtor or other
unsecured creditors of the debtor. Such an interpretation seems implausible
in view of the reference in § 1322(b)(2) to "secured claims" and "unsecured
claims," terms having important significance when determining the obligations
and rights of debtors and creditors throughout the Code.
B. RESOLUTION THROUGH THE SUPREME COURT
This spring the United States Supreme Court will resolve this issue con-
cerning the permissibility of bifurcation under § 1322(b)(2), when it consid-
ers Nobleman v. American Savings Bank (In re Nobleman),338 an appeal from
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Nobleman is the only decision from the
federal courts of appeals to hold that bifurcation of undersecured residential
mortgages is an impermissible modification under § 1322(b)(2), and represents
a split from decisions by the Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Ninth
and Tenth Circuits, which have held that bifurcation of such claims is permis-
sible under § 1322(b)(2). 339
Nobleman, like the other cases, involved debtors who filed a petition under
chapter 13. Under the plan the debtors, Leonard and Harriet Nobleman, pro-
posed to bifurcate an undersecured mortgage against their principal residence
held by American Savings Bank into secured and unsecured claims pursuant
to § 506(a). The original debt was secured by a deed of trust against the prop-
erty that was valued at $68,250. The debtors listed the property to be valued
at $23,500. The creditor filed a proof of claim against the property for
$71,335.04.
3361d.
337See supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
338968 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 654 (1992).
339Lomas Mortgage USA v. Wiese, 980 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir. 1992); Bellamy v. Federal Home Loan Mort-
gage Corp. (In re Bellamy), 969 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1992); Eastland Mortgage Co. v. Hart (In re Hart), 923
F.2d 1410 (10th Cir. 1991); Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1990); Hougland
v. Lomas & Nettleton Co. (In re Hougland), 886 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1989).
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Under the plan the debtors proposed to treat the claim as a secured claim
to the extent of the uncontested value of the property, $23,500, and proposed
to pay the creditor the "mortgage contract rate only up to the scheduled value'
of the property.3 40 The remaining balance of the claim would be treated like
all other unsecured claims, for which the plan proposed no payments. 341
Both the bankruptcy court and district court denied confirmation of the
plan, on the grounds that the bifurcation of an undersecured mortgage was not
a permissible modification under § 1322(b)(2).342 The Fifth Circuit affirmed
the decisions of the bankruptcy and district courts. In its opinion the court
recognized the division that its position represented from the other federal courts
of appeals that have considered this issue, that have held that claims under
§ 1322(b)(2) must "first be analyzed under section 506(a) to determine the part
that is fully secured" before the protection against modification could be applied
against the secured portion of the claim under § 1322(b)(2); 343 that the "appli-
cation of§ 506(a) was a recognition of the legal status of the creditor's interest
in the debtors' property and not a modification of the mortgage";344 and that
"nothing in section 1322(b)(2) affects the determination under section 506(a)
that an undersecured claim can be divided into a secured portion and an unse-
cured portion"345 However, the court felt that the Supreme Court's decision
in Dewsnup v. Timm3 46 supported its view that bifurcation is an impermissible
modification under § 1322(b)(2). 347 Yet, in making this proclamation the court
noted that the Dewsnup decision was limited to whether the term "allowed
secured claim" as used in § 506(d) permitted a debtor in a chapter 7 liquida-
tion to strip down a lien securing an undersecured claim against a debtor's real
property to the market value of the property;3 48 and that the Supreme Court
specifically stated its decision in Dewsnup did not address whether the term
"allowed secured claim" as defined under § 506(a) would have the same mean-
ing in other provisions of the Code.34 9
The part of the Fifth Circuit's opinion that provides the most signifi-
cant analysis to support its position is its analysis of the "plain meaning" of
§ 1322(b)(2); the principle of statutory construction that the more specific pro-
vision of§ 1322(b)(2) supersedes a general provision like § 506(a) where they
are in conflict; and its reading of the legislative history of§ 1322(b)(2).350 Much
340Nobleman, 968 F.2d at 485.
3411'd.
3421d.
34 Id. at 486.
3441d.
346112 S. Ct. 773 (1992).
347968 F.2d at 487.
3481d.
349 .
3 01d. at 487-89.
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of this discussion is similar to that of the other courts that also find that bifur-
cation is prohibited under § 1322(b)(2).
First, the court quotes the Supreme Court from United States v. Ron Pair
Enterprises, Inc. ,351 regarding the principle of statutory interpretation that the
"plain meaning of the language of legislation should be conclusive, except in
the 'rare cases [in which) the literal application of a statute will produce a result
demonstrably at odds with the intent of its drafters.'352 The court also refers
to the principle of statutory construction that, if two provisions of a statute
are in conflict, then the more specific provision supersedes the provision of
general application. 53 Applying these principles the court reads § 1322(b)(2) as:
[Cllearly prohibitfing] the modification of rights of holders of
secured claims if the claim is secured only by a security interest
in the debtors' principal residence. However, this prohibition
set forth in section 1322(b)(2) appears to conflict with section
506(a), which would allow the modification. If two statutes
conflict, generally accepted tenet of statutory construction
is that the general language of a statute does not "prevail over
matters specifically dealt with in another part of the same
enactment:"... We accordingly hold that the specific language
of section 1322(b)(2) prevails over the general language of sec-
tion 506(a).
Moreover, section 1322(b)(2) describes its subject mat-
ter as the modification of "the rights of holder of" claims, not
as the modification of claims as such; thus, the section can
properly be read as excepting from its reach modification of
"the rights of holders of ... a claim secured only by a secu-
rity interest in real property that is the debtor's principal resi-
dence. . . . "Therefore, even if the entirety of such a claim is
not a secured claim (as per section 506(a)), the rights of a
holder of such a claim may not be modified under section
1322(b)(2). 354
With respect to the court's analysis of the legislative history of§ 1322(b)(2),
the court looked to its earlier interpretation of the legislative history of
§ 1322(b)(2) in Grubbs v. Houston First American Savings Association.35 In that
case the court recognized § 1322(b)(2) as a compromise between the House
and Senate versions of the provision, and noted that, unlike the Senate ver-
3S-489 U.S. 235 (1989).
352968 F.2d at 488 (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989)) (quota-
tion omitted).
313968 F.2d at 488.
354Id. (citations omitted).
3s5730 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
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sion which would have prohibited the modification of mortgages against all real
estate property of a debtor, the compromise resulted in a provision limiting the
prohibition against modification to claims "secured only by a security interest
in the debtor's principal residence."356 In Grubbs the court had noted that the
purpose of this limited prohibition was to provide protection for the claims of
the home mortgage industry, which has been seen as providing an invaluable
"social service" with such loans. 3.7 However, the court in Nobleman noted that
its holding regarding § 1322(b)(2) in Grubbs did not "specifically deal with the
interplay between section 506(a) and section 1322(b)(2)'3 5 Nevertheless, it
felt that its "analysis of section 506(a) and section 1322(b)(2) [was] consistent
with the legislative history of section 1322(b)(2) of the bankruptcy code-the
desire to afford some protection to the home mortgage industry."3 9
How the Supreme Court will interpret § 1322(b)(2) and its relationship
to § 506(a) is an intriguing question to ponder. The court in Nobleman, along
with several others, seem to believe that Dewsnup supports the position that
the bifurcation of undersecured residential mortgages is a prohibited modifi-
cation under § 1322(b)(2), and that the term "allowed secured claim" as defined
in § 506(a) is not applicable to determinations under § 1322(b)(2).360 Dews
nup, however, only addressed whether a chapter 7 debtor could use § 506(d)
to strip down an undersecured real estate mortgage to its market value through
the bifurcation of the mortgage into a secured claim and an unsecured claim
pursuant to § 506(a). In its analysis of the issue, the Court was required to
determine if the term "allowed secured claim" in § 506(a) had the same mean-
ing under § 506(d) to permit a lien avoidance of the claim classified as "unse-
cured" under § 506(a). The Court concluded that the term "allowed secured
claim" as defined in § 506(a) did not have the same meaning as used in §
506(d).361 Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, specifically stated that
its decision in Dewsnup was limited to the facts of that case. 362
In spite of the statement by the Court limiting the scope of Dewsnup, Noble
man stated that Dewsnup supported its position that bifurcation was a pro-
hibited modification under § 1322(b)(2). Unfortunately, the discussion of
Dewsnup by the court in Nobleman lacks any significant analysis of why
Dewsnup is relevant to the question of bifurcation under § 1322(b)(2). In fact,
most of the other court decisions finding Dewsnup to bolster the argument that
bifurcation is prohibited under § 1322(b)(2) were not very convincing in explain-
ing or rationalizing the nexus between the Court's analysis in Dewsnup and
316968 F.2d at 488.
357Id. (citing Grubbs v. Houston First American Say. Ass'n, 730 F.2d 236, 246 (5th Cir. 1984)).
3S5968 F.2d at 489.
3'9Id. (citing Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 245-46).
360See supra notes 198-213 and accompanying text.
161112 S. Ct. at 778.
36'See supra note 174.
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the issue of the interrelationship between § 1322(b)(2) and § 506(a).3 63 Like
the court in Nobleman, these cases simply restate the findings of the Court
in Dewsnup about the interplay between § 506(a) and § 506(d); and the Court's
statements about the impact of lien stripping on creditors, that is, depriving
creditors of their bargain with the debtor, and lien stripping constituting an
unfair windfall to the debtor.
The other postDewsnup cases interpreting the interplay between §§ 1322(b)(2)
and 506(a) are more persuaded by Justice Blackmun's statement limiting the
application of Dewsnup. There are two different views about the impact of Dews-
nup on the interpretation of the interrelationship between § 1322(b)(2) and
§ 506. One group of cases express the opinion that Dewsnup does not over-
rule the application of § 506(a) to § 1322(b)(2) determinations, but that it does
prohibit lien stripping and the use of § 506(d) under § 1322(b)(2). 364 These
courts note that Dewsnup was limited to chapter 7 cases, and that the Supreme
Court focused on the permissibility of lien stripping in such cases, and recog-
nized that bifurcation in a reorganization is distinct from lien stripping in liqui-
dation cases. 365 One court has concluded that, by allowing the debtor to
bifurcate the unsecured portion of the claim, the debtor could treat that por-
tion of the claim like all other unsecured claims under the plan.3 66 The court
held that (1) this would benefit the debtor by reducing the amounts the debtor
would have to pay on the claim during the term of the plan; (2) the creditor's
interest in turn would be protected to the extent that the lien securing the
claim would survive to cover the entire claim; (3) at the end of the plan, the
debtor would receive a discharge of personal liability under § 1328, but, if any
amount remained unpaid it would be secured by the lien pursuant to§ 506(d). 367
The other view of the effect of Dewsnup on the question of bifurcation under
§ 1322(b)(2) is that Dewsnup is not determinative in resolving this issue. 368
The Second Circuit offered the most substantive analysis of any court con-
cerning the impact of Dewsnup on this question in Bellamy v. Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corp. (In re Bellamy).369 In Bellamy the court found that the term
"secured claim" is used differently in § 506(d) than it is used in § 506(a) and
§ 1322(b)(2):370 in § 506(a) the term "allowed secured claim" is more concerned
with the extent to which a claim is actually secured, which is how the term
is used in § 1322(b)(2); whereas, in § 506(d) the concern is with liens and the
363See supra notes 198-213 and accompanying text.
364 See supra notes 214-34 and accompanying text.
36S'Id.
366In re Dyer, 142 B.R. 364, 369 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1992); also see supra notes 224-34 and accompanying text.
367jd
,368See supra notes 187-97 and accompanying text.
369962 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1992).
370See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
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survival of liens under the Code. 371 The court in Bellamy also noted a distinc-
tion between the legislative history behind § 506(d) and 1322(b)(2). It stated
that, while there was insufficient legislative history behind § 506(d) for the
Supreme Court to satisfy its concern that pre-Code practice regarding the
survival of liens had been changed by Congress under § 506(d), this was not
the case with § 1322(b)(2), because the legislative history was explicit in
providing that debtors be able to deal with creditor claims that are secured
by real property under chapter 13.372 Thus, the language of § 1322(b)(2) did
not alter a well-settled principle of bankruptcy law, but furthered a stated
scheme of Congress. 373 The court also noted that under chapter 13 the debtor's
personal liability continues under the plan, and beyond the term of the plan
to the extent that the long-term debt remains unpaid, whereas in chapter 7
the debtor's liability is terminated. 374 Moreover, it noted that stripdowns
furthered the purpose of reorganization by enabling the debtor to keep his or
her home.375
How the Supreme Court will view the relevance of its decision in Dews-
nup in considering the appeal of Nobleman is an opportunity for great specu-
lation. Because the Court was explicit in limiting its decision in Dewsnup to
the facts of that case, it seems reasonable to assume that the Court will fol-
low its words of limitation and begin its consideration of the interplay between
§ 506(a) and § 1322(b)(2) with a clean slate. In recognizing the numerous ways
that § 506 might be applied throughout the several chapters of the Code, Jus-
tice Blackmun stated, "Hypothetical applications that come to mind ... illus-
trate the difficulty of interpreting the statute in a single opinion that would
apply to all possible fact situations. We therefore focus upon the case before
us and allow other facts to await their legal resolution on another day. 376 The
points of distinction between the facts and issues addressed by Dewsnup
and those confronted in a consideration of the interplay between § 506 and
§ 1322(b)(2) raised by the court in Bellamy confirm the propriety of the Court's
limitation of Dewsnup.
Assuming the Court will interpret the interplay between § 506(a) and
§ 1322(b)(2) with a fresh viewpoint, and apply the rules of statutory construc-
tion that it has employed in recent decisions requiring an interpretation of
Bankruptcy Code provisions, it would seem most persuasive for it to adopt the
position that bifurcation is permissible under § 1322(b)(2). In several of its recent







376112 S. Ct. at 778.
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to the plain language of the relevant statutory provisions to find meaning, and
has noted that where the language is clear and unambiguous that is where the
Court's analysis should stop. 377 In cases where the statutory language is found
to be unclear and ambiguous the Court has consulted the legislative history.
As the Court stated in Toibb v. Radloff,3 7s "ITIhis Court has repeated with
some frequency: 'Where, as here, the resolution of a question of federal law
turns on a statute and the intention of Congress, we look first to the statu-
tory language and then to the legislative history if the statutory language is
unclear."' 379
Even where the legislative history may make some suggestion of an intent
contrary to the plain language of the statute, the Court has been unwilling to
alter the meaning of the language of the statute where the legislative history
is scant and not clear in stating an intent contrary to the language of the stat-
ute. 380 In Toibb v. Radloff the Court held that the language of§ 109 of the Code
did not preclude nonbusiness debtors from filing a petition in bankruptcy for
relief under chapter 11. However, the respondents in that case suggested that
the legislative history intended to exclude nonbusiness debtors from chapter
11 relief. The Court held, "even were we to consider the sundry legislative
comments -urged in support of a Congressional intent to exclude a nonbusi-
ness debtor from Chapter 11, the scant legislative history on this precise issue
does not suggest a 'clearly expressed legislative inten[t] ... contrary ... to
the plain language of § 109(d)*"381
The language of section 1322(b)(2) states that the debtor may:
modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a
claim secured only by a security interest in real property that
is the debtor's principal residence, or holders of unsecured
claims, or leave unaffected the rights of holders of any class
of claims. 38 2
As noted above, courts supporting the bifurcation of undersecured residen-
tial mortgages have argued that the plain language of § 1322(b)(2) clearly per-
mits a debtor to modify secured claims in personal and real property with the
exception of claims secured by a debtor's principal residence. They argue that
this prohibition against modification is limited to the secured portion of the
claim secured by the debtor's principal residence, and requires the application of
177Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992); Toibb v. Radloff, 111 S. Ct. 2197 (1991); United States
v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
378111 S. Ct. 2197 (1991).
3791d. at 2200 (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984)).
380M. at 2200 (quoting Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 337 U.S. 102, 108
(1980)).
381111 S. Ct. at 2200.
38211 U.S.C.A. § 1322(b)(2) (West Supp. 1993).
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§ 506(a) to determine the extent to which the claim is secured. This reading
of§ 1322(b)(2) is based on the fact that the phrase "modify the rights of holders
of secured claims" is placed immediately before the phrase "other than a claim
secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's prin-
cipal residence."383 It can be argued that this is the grammatically correct and
natural reading of the provision, that is clear, straightforward and unambigu-
ous. This application of § 506(a) is also suggested as natural and appropriate
in the context of the statutory scheme of the Code, and the fact that § 103
of the Code directs one to use the provisions of chapter 5 throughout chap,
ters 7, 11, 12 and 13 of the Code. 38 4
Courts taking the contrary position focus on the language in § 1322(b)(2),
"rights of holders... of the claim secured by a security interest in real prop-
erty that is the debtor's principal residence". Thus, they direct emphasis on
the rights of these claimants as opposed to the status of the claims they hold
as secured claims or unsecured claims. 385 Again, the problem with this read-
ing is that it is selective and ignores or deemphasizes the drafters' use of the
terms "secured claims" and "unsecured claims" in the provision, and would
appear to violate the interpretive mission of a court to give meaning to the com-
plete statutory provision and not selectively chosen parts of the provision.
Should the Court find the language of § 1322(b)(2) to be conclusive and
feel justified in ending its interpretive mission with the plain language of the
provision, it may nevertheless elect to review the legislative history of the pro,
vision, as it has done in other cases where it had held the plain language of
the provision to be clear.3 6 If this review and analysis of legislative history is
made by the Court, it will find a history that expresses a clear intent to alter
pre-Code practice of excluding claims held by creditors that are secured by an
interest in the debtor's real property from chapter 13 relief.38 7 It will find dis-
cussions of a legislative compromise to provide some protection against modifi-
cation of home mortgages to protect the home mortgage lending industry.388
In its comparison of the language of the provision with its legislative history,
it will not find the language of the statute to be "demonstrably at odds with
the intention of the drafters" as expressed in the legislative history.389 When
reviewing the legislative history of§ 1322(b)(2), it will not find an expression
of clear intent by the drafters to prohibit the use of§ 506(a) and the determi-
383In re Demoff, 109 B.R. 902 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989).
38411 U.S.C.A. § 103(a) (West 1993). Also see cases cited supra note 86.
3'8 See cases cited supra note 135.
386Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242,2248 (1992); Toibb v. Radloff, 111 S. Ct. 2197,2200 (1991).
387See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
388I.
3B9United States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 ("The plain meaning of legislation should be
conclusive, except in the rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result demon'
strably at odds with the intentions of its drafters'") (quotation omitted).
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nation of the secured status of the home mortgage when applying the protec-
tions provided to home mortgages under § 1322(b)(2).
Had Congress intended to prohibit the use of§ 506(a) under § 1322(b)(2),
it would have specifically provided for such a restriction as it did under
§ 1111(b)(2)(A) of the Code. 390 A prohibition against the use of § 506(a) to
determine the secured portion of the undersecured residential mortgage under
§ 1322(b)(2) would be contrary to the plain language of § 1322(b)(2) and the
language and statutory scheme of the Code as provided under §§ 103 and 506.
At the most, the question concerning the treatment of undersecured mortgages
against a debtor's principal residence under § 1322(b)(2) is an example of an "un-
foreseen circumstance" by its drafters, which does not justify judicial revision of
the meaning of the provision. As the Court stated in Union Bank v. Wolas, 391 'The
fact that Congress may not have foreseen all of the consequences of an enact-
ment is not a sufficient reason of refusing to give effect to its plain meaning "392
39011 U.S.C.A. § 1111(b)(2)(A) (West 1979).
391112 S. Ct. 527 (1991).
3921d. at 531. Although the question to be addressed by the Court in considering Nobleman will con-
cern the permissibility of using § 506(a) to bifurcate undersecured residential mortgages under § 1322(b)(2),
the Court may elect to determine whether the lien avoidance provision of § 506(d) may also be used by
debtors to avoid the lien against the unsecured portion of such a claim under § 1322(b)(2). While it has
been persuasively argued that lien avoidance would be prohibited in such cases by virtue of the Court's
decision in Dewsnup, the Court has given itself some leeway to consider separately the question of lien avoid,
ance under chapter 13, independent of its ruling in Dewsnup, which was specifically limited to the determi-
nation of the permissibility of lien avoidance of undersecured residential mortgages in a chapter 7 liquidation.
112 S. Ct. at 778.
Should the Court decide to consider this question in Nobleman, one might argue that, if the debtor's
relief under chapter 13 is to be truly meaningful, the debtor should be permitted not only to bifurcate the
undersecured residential mortgage, but also to avoid the lien to the extent of the unsecured portion of the
claim. This position might be supported by making a distinction between the objectives of a chapter 7 liqui-
dation and a chapter 13 rehabilitation, and the relief to be provided to the debtor and the protections to
be afforded the creditor thereunder.
After a case is closed under a chapter 7 liquidation, the debtor receives a discharge from personal lia-
bility on the unpaid amounts on the mortgage obligation. 11 U.S.C.A. § 727 (West 1979 & Supp. 1993).
In contrast, the debtor in a chapter 13 rehabilitation remains personally liable for all mortgage payments
made under the plan and payments that will be due on the mortgage after the completion of the plan. 11
U.S.C.A. § 1328(a)(1) (West Supp. 1993). Accordingly, in a chapter 13 case the debtor remains liable for
the remaining amounts due on the mortgage, and the lien remains against the property to secure that obli-
gation. If, however, the lien is not avoided to the extent of the unsecured portion of the claim, the debtor's
property will remain overburdened to that extent, just as it was before the relief in bankruptcy was sought
by the debtor.
Unlike chapter 7 relief, chapter 13 specifically gives debtors the right to "modify" the secured claims
of creditors holding liens against the debtor's real and personal property, as well as unsecured claims. 11
U.S.C.A. § 1322(b)(2) (West 1979). The purpose of this provision is to make chapter 13 available to more
debtors so that they might elect relief under chapter 13 to rehabilitate their financial condition as opposed
to seeking relief through straight liquidation under chapter 7. Because the term "modify" has not been defined
or limited by the Code, the avoidance of the lien against the unsecured portion of the residential mortgage
would not be contrary to the expressed grant of authority to the debtor to "modify" the unsecured portion
of the residential mortgage under chapter 13, but arguably would be allowable and in harmony with the
chapter 13 mission to assist the debtor in reorganizing and rehabilitating his or her financial obligations.
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C. RESOLUTION THROUGH LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT
If the bifurcation of undersecured residential mortgages is to be a prohibited
modification under § 1322(b)(2), then it should be a mandate by Congress. Dur-
ing the 102d Congressional term several bills were introduced in the Senate
and the House proposing major revision to the Bankruptcy Code. Included
among these bills was H.R. 6020,393 which came very close to being passed
by both houses of Congress. This bill included a provision to amend § 1322(b)(2)
to prohibit the bifurcation of undersecured residential mortgages.3 94 This pro-
posed legislation was not passed by the House due to last minute changes made
to the bill by the Senate, none of which related to the proposed change to
§ 1322(b)(2). There is however, reason to believe that similar legislative revi-
sion will be introduced in the new Congress this spring.
Much of this proposed legislation received its support from the creditor
community. The home mortgage lending industry provided a strong voice in
favor of prohibitions against the bifurcation of undersecured residential mort-
gages during hearings conducted by the Senate and House subcommittees
responsible for the proposed bankruptcy legislation. Although there were only
a few consumer/debtor representatives testifying during the hearings, they
offered sound and thoughtful arguments in favor of the bifurcation of underse-
cured residential mortgages in chapter 13 cases.
Representatives of the mortgage backed securities market from Freddie Mac
and GNMA argued that the continuation of cramdowns of undersecured mort-
gages would have an adverse affect on this market, an important source of financ-
ing for home mortgage funding. 395 They stated that the market is affected in
two ways by cramdowns. First, the lender/issuer of the security remains
obligated to pay the full value of the security principal and interest to inves-
tors regardless of the fact that a chapter 13 debtor/mortgagor's liability for the
mortgage debt has been reduced to the actual market value of the security
through a cramdown. This potential risk of loss to the issuer lessens the attrac-
tiveness of these mortgages and securities. Moreover, the risk could ultimately
393H.R. 6020, 102d Cong, 2d Sess. (1992).
391Section 202 of the bill provides:
Section 1322(b)(2) of title 11, United States Code, is amended (1) by striking "other
than a claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's
principal residence," and (2) by inserting before the semi-colon at the end the following:
except that the rights of the holder of a claim secured only by the most
senior security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal
residence may not be modified to reduce the secured claim to a value
that is less than the value, as of the date the security interest arose,
of the creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property.
H.R. 6020, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 202 (1992).
393See supra notes 249-63 and accompanying text.
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rest on the guarantor if the lender/issuer is unable to make these payments
to the investors. 396 Although the actual losses sustained by the guarantors and
issuers has been minimal, representatives of Freddie Mac and GNMA urged
Congress to prohibit cramdowns to avoid mass losses to this market in the event
of an unforeseen economic downturn. 397
These commentators, along with other representatives of the mortgage lend-
ing industry, have consistently argued that the cramdown of residential mort-
gages was not intended by Congress, and results in an unfair windfall to the
debtor, through the reduction of the debt to its actual value and in allowing
the debtor to keep his or her home. 398 Moreover, they contend that the cram-
down deprives the creditor of the benefits of property appreciation. 399 They
have also suggested that, if cramdowns were not prohibited, the availability
of home mortgage loans would be threatened. 400
The commentators appearing before the House and Senate subcommittees
in support of the cramdown of undersecured residential mortgages have
responded in kind to the arguments made by the mortgage lending industry
representatives. 401 In response to the mortgage lending industry's suggestion
that cramdowns are unfair to creditors and provide windfalls to debtors, these
commentators argue that cramdowns are critical to a debtor's ability to rehabili-
tate under chapter 13, and to achieve the fresh start that Congress intended
for a debtor as a result of filing bankruptcy.402 They have also noted that the
application of § 506 in chapter 13 and throughout other chapters of the Code
is essential to achieve fair distribution of a debtor's estate to creditors. The
cramdown simply duplicates the result of liquidation and prevents creditors
from avoiding the effects of discharge by taking a lien against a debtor's prop-
erty to secure all loans with a debtor.403
Cramdown supporters have also argued that a prohibition against cram-
downs would insulate lender/issuers from liability on undersecured mortgages
by removing the risk of not being able to collect on government or private insur-
ance against these mortgages. 404 Because of the FHA and VA policy to pay
only the secured portion of the claim in the event of a cramdown, the mort-
gage lender is more likely to assure that overappraisal of property does not
occur.40 5 However, without the cramdown, the mortgage lender would have
396See supra notes 255-61 and accompanying text.
3978See supra note 261.
39 See testimony set forth in part V.A. supra.
399Id.
4001d.
4olSee supra notes 272-92, 302-11 and accompanying text.
402See supra notes 272-80 and accompanying text.
4
°
3See supra notes 272-84 and accompanying text.
404See supra notes 285-88 and accompanying text.
405'd.
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little incentive to see that appraisals are not inflated, and this would allow the
lender to pass to guarantors the potential risks of guaranteeing overappraised
property.4 06
In response to the threat of declining home mortgage financing, cramdown
supporters have noted that the home mortgage lending industry has offered
no hard evidence to show that cramdowns have in fact caused a reduction in
mortgage lending.407 Moreover, the number of debtor homeowners with mort-
gages exceeding the value of the property and debtors using § 506 to cram-
down mortgages has been low.408 Furthermore, most cases involving a cramdown
are cases where the property has been overappraised or junior lienholders have
taken mortgages against oversecured property, examples of creditor abuse in
mortgate lending that do not merit protection by Congress.409
Fortunately, for chapter 13 debtors, this legislation was not passed. And
while the reason for its failure had nothing to do with the merits of permit-
ting or prohibiting bifurcation of undersecured residential mortgages under
§ 1322(b)(2), the fact that it was not passed gives Congress more time to con-
sider the effect an amendment prohibiting the bifurcation of such claims at
bankruptcy. Perhaps, as one commentator has suggested, such an amendment
is an unnecessary part of a "creditor's wish list."410 Perhaps more evidence needs
to be brought forth to justify protecting undersecured residential mortgages
against the debtor's need for a "fresh start" and the general principle support-
ing creditor equality under the Code.
4061d.
407See supra notes 289-90 and accompanying text.
40 'See supra notes 290-92 and accompanying text.
409See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
4lOSee supra note 302 and accompanying text.

